CIA Manual: Defeating Urban Violence (Counterinsurgency)

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NOTE 
F 	This publication is intended for general guidance of officials 
charged with combating urban violence. 
Concepts presented are in Summary format only, and emphasis is 
* on “what. to do" and not how to do it. The intention is to provide an 
ea halla and composite of systems recommended for defeating urban 
violence. — 	: 
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CONTENTS 
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is PREFACE. 	sseccccvecevcercnccnccetantacsereneesersserseseeses 
2. URBAN 	FNM VRONMENT: 	sxvinicur 	aren sSoecsisarersaasatteewane 	mene waen 
3. OPPOSITION TACTICS...cccccccsceecocscccccccuserevcnceucercs 
4, CONTROL: MEASURES.vscccccccceccccccucceerccceceesnceseecesns 
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Psychological and Political..csccccssccccsscccncsescces 
Terrorist. 	cocsscccceccccseucccccceseccecereucesecuesuce 
SADOTACE 6:0 sce 'ee as peienai are we -ae i in Gia @wikcwraoe ta'e Sona ecate aeealatbon oes 
Propaganda 	and Agitation. 	ees@npecuaenvn@uenpevaene 	ees teeaetseeoan 
Armed Violence... ..csccceesvecs Moye Sea ce ehae wa cena ues 
Assassination and Kidnapping. . Bide einlace Scere svaiesh bee 8 wie Goe-ace 
INFILErBHAOD 	sv nvscsanssenvesecsvvsecnevessvesccvovecne 
Mob WIOTENCE 5 suis nacusniswa etiadesaaee sa aa ss cin ae ewueee sa 
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PREFACE 
Whether nationalist or Marxist in ideology, many present day sub- 
versives have opted for urban-oriented violence. They have largely 
rejected the rural-based guerrilla tactics advocated by Mao Tse-tung, 
The change to. an urban focus is attributable to a combination of 
factors to include (1) accelerated urbanization; (2) massive discontent 
version; and (5) significant success achieved by urban terrorist groups. 
‘of a target regime. Such a climate is created by the effective use of 
Belfast, Montreal and other cities. Urban violence has also occurred 
ence is far. greater “In.the less developed nations. 
Given the ‘expanded threat, it is the purpose of this study to 
explore the various forms of violence and recommend adequate control 
systems. 
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_Ho Chi Minh, and Ernesto "Che" Guevara, among other insurgent theoreticians. 
among students, intellectuals, labor, minorities, and impoverished ghetto 
residents; (3) non-adaptability of guerrilla tactics for largely passive 
rural populations; (4) conspicuous failure of recent rural-oriented sub- 
Thus, kidnapping, hijacking, assassination, bombing, riots, strikes, 
and other forms of urban violence will probably continue to be familiar 
‘ hazards of life in the 1970's. The sponsors of such acts are essentially 
political partisans. Success or failure depends on the partisan's ability 
to induce a "climate of collapse" which stimulates the defeat or overthrow 
violence designed to gain control of men's minds, erode moral consensus, 
harden political battle lines, and stimulate radical right-wing response. 
This violent battle of psychological manipulation has appeared 
‘in Montevideo, Guatemala City, Sao Paulo, New Delhi, Calcutta, Saigon, 
‘in the United States, but its scope and influ-

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URBAN ENVIRONMENT 
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Most urban centers generally afford a “hot bed" for political 
dissidence. The growth media@e the various discontented population 
elements to include (1) idealistic students and intellectuals frus- 
trated by the status quo; (2) underpaid and underemployed labor antagonized 
* by corporate exploitation; (3) religious, ethnic, class, or social groups 
who suffer from inferiority complexes; (4) unemp layed sium dweliers out~ 
raged by their inability to achieve even marginal subsistence within the 
existing social-political-economic systems; and (5) other groups who 
sense some relative deprivation, 
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If any combination of the above circumstances exist, violence only 
awaits the addition of leadership, organization, agitation, propaganda, 
support, and development of a "cause". All of these factors can be 
provided by a smal] clandestine cadre dedicated to defeat or overthrow of 
the existing target government. 
These cadre can readily recruit action agents from among dissident 
population elements. Funds are often obtained via kidnappings, bank 
robberies, extortion, or other similar actions. Food and other basic 
supplies can be purchased or stolen as needed. Medical supplies and 
services are generally available from hospitals, pharmacies, universities, 
and medical. students. Chemicals, explosives, arms and ammunition may be 
- purchased openly or on the Black Market. Failing this, these items can 
be stolen from manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers or depots such as 
armories. Intelligence on government forces may be obtained via human 
or technical penetration operations, bribery, communications intercept, 
and simple theft of documents. 	: 
Target acquisition is a relatively eines process since most 
urban areas contain government facilities or installations, official 
or diplomatic personnel, foreign embassies, business firms, etc. 
Meeting places can be located in residences, offices, factories, parks, 
public facilities, or any other location where small groupings of 
personnel can gather with some degree of secrecy. Likewise, safe sites 
j and "drops" are also readily available in similar locations. Mobility 
¥ options include movement by foot, private or stolen vehicles, and 
i public transport. Route selection is rdatively simple given the quantity 
i of streets, alleys, and walkways. Cover and concealment is achieved by 
blending with metreeelivan population masses which accept “casual” contact 
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with strangers and generally ignore unusual activity’ undertaken by any 
iy: individual. Communication techniques include use of telephone, tele- 
, graph, mails, couriers and radios with appropriate utilization of simple 
word or phrase codes to provide security. Terrain advantage can be 
gained by using tops of buildings. Underground structures such as base- 
ments, subways and sewer lines may also be used to facilitate movement 
or concealment. 
In brief, a metropolitan area affords the total gamut of resources 
(men, money, material and intelligence) needed for the conduct of violence 
operations. The only remaining ingredient is the development of sub- 
versive tactics, strategy and organization. 
- OPPOSITION TACTICS 
In terms of tactics, urban violence is similar to rural-oriented 
guerrilla warfare. From the communist point of view, the former is 
basically an extension of guerrilla principles to a metropolitan setting. 
However, the rural-based operatives have a much greater capability to 
maneuver using isolated or controlled "sanctuaries" to facilitate the 
conduct of extensive paramilitary warfare tactics. The urban insurgents 
are confined to a potentially hostile environment. This necessarily 
limits their efforts to small-scale clandestine acts of violence which 
will avoid direct sustained confrontation with superior security forces. 
An urban and/or rural-based subversive effort may be simultaneous 
but separate, mutually supporting or limited to a singular approach. 
Primary doctrinal emphasis has been on rural-oriented guerrilla warfare. 
It is for this reason that communist urban violence doctrine is not 
particularly well developed. However, even if detailed concepts existed, 
there would be great variation of form since approaches will vary 
according to the social, economic, political, psychological and security 
factors relating to a specific urban environment. The primary communist 
dnput (from Moscow, Peking, Havana or elsewhere) is the offer of sympathy, 
training and limited support to dissidents who are the potential or 
existing cadre for a subversive movement. . 	. 
Creation of various national cadre elements can result from 
recruitment programs conducted by external and/or internal forces of 
subversion, or the necessary leadership may arise from internal conflicts 
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causing the aggravated "elite" citizen to seeks ways and means to over- 
dy throw his government. In either case, communist models of revolution 
. are usually duplicated because they offer the most prevalent example of 
e a proven means for dramatically and forcibly altering conditions per- 
“g ceived as being intolerable. 	; 
4 : Once the leader elements are created, the process of clandestine 
1 organization may be initiated. The basic principle is that personnel, 
i *-mechanisms, modus operandi, ideology and goals of subversion must necessarily 
i . vemain secret to survive repressive government reaction or to maintain deception. 
i Further, experience has Proven that personnel can most effectively and 
| safely function in small specialized clandestine "cells" each compartmented 
from the other. Types of cells include cadre, agitators, saboteurs, 
terrorists, informants and agents, propagandists, political activists, 
psychological and action elements, communication nets, Support assets, 
"front" or population organizers, and other functional units contributing 
to the conduct of subversion. Sources of recruits are as indicated in the 
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versive activities. Approaches include (1) the "carrot" which promises 
to somehow eliminate all those conditions the target populace conceives 
as being intolerable, and (2) the "stick" which threatens to punish 
will have sufficient power to force the collapse, defeat, or overthrow of a 
target government. Failing the achievement of these primary methods, 
a subversive force may attempt coups, palace revolutions, election engineering 
or induced social-economic-political "collapse" to accomplish an expedient 
victory. 
Examples of urban guerrilla tactics include (1) terrorism or the 
systematic use of intimidation for political énds; (2) sabotage désigned 
to disrupt socio-economic development and impede government's ability to 
meet the population's "felt needs"; (3) propaganda and agitation oriented 
toward creating a “crisis of confidence" regarding government's intent or 
ability to resolve major problems; (4) armed violence intended to expose 
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the weakness of government security forces; (5) kidnapping operations to 
free political prisoners, extract concessions, capture publicity and provoke 
controversy; (6) demonstrations, strikes, and riots to exploit popular 
grievances or establish a mutuality of “cause” between subversives and 
dissident population elements; and (7) infiltration and selective assassi- 
nation designed to neutralize the effective functioning of security forces 
or other government agencies. 
Despite the multiplicity of tactical options, the perpetrators of 
contemporary urban-oriented subversion have frequently failed to mobilize 
popular support. This failure is due largely to the inability of sub- 
versive elements to convince potential supporters that there are no 
prospects for constitutional change or non-violent reform. Future doc- 
trine on urban violence techniques may therefore concentrate on better 
tactics to erode public confidence in any governmental system. Possible 
conceptual solutions include a massive breakdown of internal security, 
economic chaos, and a polarization of political forces around the “law 
and order" issue. Ideally, this approach would also cause target govern- 
ments to implement repressive measures which would help convince the 
population that non-violent change is impossible. 
Urban violence tactics and strategy arethus in an evolutionary 
process which has yet to produce the ultimate conceptual or doctrinal 
approach. Unfortunately, as various-revolutionaries learn by trial and 
error, previous weaknesses will be noted and appropriate corrective action 
- taken, em 	4 
Despite the fluid status of urban-oriented revolutionary doctrine, 
essential working principles should remain the same as those discussed 
herein. Given the validity of this assumption, we will attempt to out- 
line appropriate urban violence control systems in the next section. 
NOTE: Reference materials will include a listing of contemporary urban 
guerrilla doctrine for individual officers who may be concerned with a 
more detailed tactical or strategic analysis. 	an 
CONTROL SYSTEMS 
Psychological and Political 
Attitudes of the target population must be manipulated to create 
_ favorable impressions regarding government and unfavorable opinions of 
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the urban guerrillas. In the battle for men's minds, essential actions 
should include (1) development of programs designed to meet “felt needs" 
4 and resolve conditions perceived as being intolerable by various popula- 
tion elements; (2) upgrading of security force capabilities to provide 
population protection and freedom from fear; (3) effective utilization 
of "law and due process" to convince the populace that government wil] 
defeat the subversives without utilizing repressive measures; and (4) 
creation of institutional and governmental mechanisms that provide the 
‘means for effective "change" without violence. 
The developmental or modernization approach usually requires human, 
technological and capital inputs at a rate which will provide substantial 
agricultural and/or industrial growth. This is a long-term and complex 
. Solution which cannot be achieved easily without adequate savings, trade, 
aid, or credit. In addition to the above inputs, markets must be developed; 
producer incentives created; income and employment levels increased; 
educational programs expanded; birth rates reduced to something Tess than 
Gross National Product increases; and skilled manpower, energy sources, 
‘raw materials, machinery or other capital items must be assembled at the 
production point. Apart from these overall development efforts, dissident 
ang. dppoverished population elements should be provided with basic minimal 
anice plus the opportunity for socio-economic self-advancement. 
Security improvement programs should be based upon legislative 
actions which provide the police and other internal defense forces with 
appropriate increases in leadership, manpower, training, finarrce, commu- 
nications, mobility, weapons, equipment and material. Essential tactical 
innovations will be discussed under the sections on’ terrorism, sabotage, 
riots, etc. The fundamental basis for improving security operations jis 
via better intelligence collection and collation. Human/technical pene- 
trations, agent or informant operations, prisoner interrogation, communications 
intercept, and investigative techniques all provide essential information 
ues Pia eo yier on of this data should result eventually in the 
entification of subversive leadership, cadre, action 	a ji 
modus operandi, organizational patterns, Se Goi 	ideo log 
intentions, facilities, mechanisms, and other details. In turn, the 
finished intelligence product is used to provide targets or operational 
leads and as legal evidence for judicial processing of subversives. 
Regarding "law and due process", it is esséntial that judicial pro- 
cedures be established to assure that violence control measures are 
politically, legally and morally justifiable. This is particularly true 
- Of methods used to arrest, detain, interrogate, convict and imprison or 
f execute individual members of a subversive movement. If repressive, brutal, 
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or illegal tactics are used by the government to attack subversive forces, 
popular sentiment may favor success of the latter. 
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Creation of adaptive and responsible institutions provide government 
with its most effective psychological weapon against violence. Assuming 
such organizations provide the basis for peaceful constructive change, 
the perpetrators of violence cannot justify their methods to a target 
populace. In fact, history has proven that the urban guerrilla cannot 
long survive in an environment where popular political, economic, or — 
social aspirations can be achieved by non-violent methods. 
: Subversion and social unrest thrives on the inability of a nation 
to modernize existing private or governmental institutions in a manner 
which will facilitate the effective, peaceful resolution of intolerable 
conditions, It is therefore essential that government assure that there 
is an adaptive organizational basis for reform, modernization and progres- 
sive change. This process must include government bureaucracy, political 
parties, unions, cooperatives, youth groups, and other private institutions. 
Past experience has shown that governments or societies least vul- 
nerable to subversion are those at the political extremes, to include 
(1) the most permissive and pluralistic because they are best able to 
remove the causes of revolt; and (2) the most repressive and totalitarian 
because they are best able to supress the first stirrings of revolt. 
Since the U.S. must necessarily reject the latter, we have attempted to 
outline effective approaches to the former, as indcated above; 
Terrorist » ne 	2 
(Gffensive) terror tactics involve the use of. discriminate or indis- 
criminate violence designed to aid the subversive overthrow of a target 
government, or to expand the influence of terrorist sponsors. By exten- 
sive use of assassination and bombing, the terrorists’ primary objective 
is to cow a target population and create a crisis of confidence in 
government. As a result, the terrorists hope to isolate the population 
from target government influence for the purpose of control, or to erode 
socio-economic development and the effective employment of security forces. 
In addition, terrorist action may be undertaken to expand the potential 
source of intelligence, recruitment, sympathy or support. 
The strategic intent of offensive terror is oriented toward stimu- 
lating massive population agitation over goverments seeming inability to 
Provide freedom from fear and developmental progress designed to meet 
felt needs. As_previously noted, additional purposes are to erode moral 
consensus, harden political battle lines, and stimulate radical right-wing 
response. Terror is thus primarily political in nature and normally a 
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| tactic of subversive or criminal elements who seek viability and power by 
i, creating an antagonistic barrier between a population and its government. 
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r 	To be effective, the terrorist is dependent upon clandestine organi- 
if zation, leadership, target intelligence, ideology, tactical mobility, 
technical skills, cover and concealment, plus a neutral target population. 
a However, an exception to this latter requirement must be made for inter- 
| national terrorists who operate from "base areas" outside the target nation. 
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-. A current example is provided by Arab terrorist organizations operating 
against Israel... 
Although the objectives of international terrorists usually conform 
to the norm, they may have the additional goal of influencing other nations 
not to support a particular government against which they are targetted. 
It is a kind of influencing subversion designed to erode the political, 
economic and defensive strength of any country the terrorists are attempting 
to destroy. 	, 
pewtee”” defensive terror i the employment of violence against the offensive 
. terrorists. This may be overtly or covertly undertaken by a target 
government, or it may be employed by independent groups who are in oppo- 
sition to terrorist forces and objectives. The key to defensive terror 
is intelligence collection and collation for the purpose of identifying 
the principal personalities and action elements of a terrorist movement. 
Overt, covert or semi-covert operations may then be mounted to eliminate 
violently terrorist cadre, functionaries, and supporting mechanisms. 
____. The fundamental problem with this approach is that terror begets more terro: 
‘and the general population usually becomes antagohistic toward government: 
because of this consequence. Even if government is not the overt or <s0 
covert sponsor of defensive terror, suspicion and accusation will 
eventually lead to an official image of brutal repression which does 
not enhance the legal government's chances for survival. 
Counterterror is often mistaken for defensive terror to which it 
is only remotely related. The technique of counterterror employs 
intelligence to identify terrorists who are then neutralized by 
organized controlled government forces within accepted parameters of 
justice within the law. The basic ingredients for an effective counter- 
terror program are as follows: 	, 
. @. Terrorist Profiles - can be used to provide security per- 
sonnel with a.classic thumbnail description of individuals who warrant 
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close scrutiny as potential participarts in acts of violence. This approach 
facilitates narrowing the focus of investigative and intelligence operations 
designed to identify members of terrorist organizations. Further, the pro- 
file improves routine observation by police and other authorities responsible 
for internal security. 
An example profile of a potential terrorist might. indicate way 
‘basic characteristics to include (1) male or female age 16 to 58; (2) me, 
“member of potentially dissident group; (3) person with emotional or 
fanatical tendency; (4) individual who has evidenced violent behavior or 
emotional instability; (5) citizens who are isolated from the national as 
socio-economic or political "mainstream"; (6) radicals who have engaged AY 
in demands for revolutionary change; and (7) individuals who obviously x 
have nothing to lose by engaging in terrorism. 
Potential terrorist traits should be evaluated in accordance 
With each particular local or national environment. The main objective 
being to create a system that is easily developed and readily applied by 
all. security or intelligence personnel. 
b. Documentation Controls - facilitate security forces in 
their efforts to identify suspect terrorists and their supporters. Popu- 
lation identification papers should be designed to allow the police to 
spot-check any individual's name, date and place of birth, residence, family 
status, employment, race, religion, and physical description. Photographs 
and fingerprints can also be added to documents. In cases of emergency, 
citizens may be required to obtain special documentation for travel and 
resource control permits for the purchase of any item that might be used 
to aid a terrorist act.. 
The intended objective of detailed documentaion is to aid 
the screening of an entire population. When used in conjunction with 
terrorist profiles ad when properly focused on areas where violence has 
occurred, the system can be effective in providing investigative leads. | 
c. Biographic Registry - involves the establishment of a were s 
central security reference containing biographic card files or computer 
data on all known criminals, subversives, terrorists, dissidents and 
suspicious personalities, Each security and intelligence service would 
provide appropriate biographic inputs, and have controlled access to the 
complete registry. Sources and information would be protected by appro- 
priate compartmentation and security clearance procedures, ~ 
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| 	In effect, a national biographic reference is created to 
ei. facilitate collation of all-source intelligence on confirmed or suspect 
af terrorists. If the quality and quantity of information inputs are ade- 
quate, all security personnel can use existing files as the basis for 
rapidly determining any person's possible association with terrorist. 
| or subversive activity. By establishing secure radio procedures for \ 
t sending queries to the biographic registry, any policeman with appropriate 
i communication can immediately validate the Suspect status of individuals 
A . . *, Stopped for spot-checks. 
‘The biographic registry does not negate the need to investi- 
gate or collect intelligence on potential terrorists having or not having 
files, but it does preclude Suspect persons from going unnoticed easily. 
d. Personnel and Physical Security - must necessarily be 
provided for the indigenous leaders and government personnel who will 
likely be targetted for terrorist violence. This requirement -includes 
protection of individuals from threats, coercion, assassination and 
bombing: the latter actiok will prompt the need for physical security 
of offices, homes, meeting places and transportation facilities. 
. General defensive procedures include (1) personnel security 
Clearances; (2) entry and exit control for offices; (3) protective fences 
:-~ for fixed facilities; (4) guards for. personnel and buildings;. (5) 
a ba screening of communications, mail and cargo; (6) use of metal detectors 
for routine weapon's search; (7) utilization of bomb squads with dogs 
trained to smell out plastic explosives; (8) travel control procedures 
emphasizing alternate routes and various methods of transportation; (9) 
' Street patrols in the area of offices and individual homes; and (10) 
other techniques appropriate to environmental situations. ; 
The primary objective of such elaborate precautions is to 
frustrate the effective conduct of terrorist actions and thereby prevent 
those spectacular Successes which encourage expanded future violence. 
To focus defensive efforts better and conserve resource 
allocation, it is essential that hard intelligence be obtained on 
terrorist intentions and modus operandi. This intelligence effort 
also provides the basis for offensive actions designed to negate terrorist 
violence before it can be employed. Personnel and physical security is 
thus achieved by a combination of defensive and offensive programs, the 
latter of which can be the most effective. The offensive methods will be - 
discussed further in Subsequent sections. 	é 
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: 	e. Intelligence Collection - is essential to the conduct of 
d i effective counterterror operations. Neutralization of violence is dependent 
upon government having some knowledge of terrorist personalities, organi- 
zation, plans, intentions, ideology, modus operandi and Support mechanisms. 
Without such knowledge, Security forces will be unable to focus properly 
defensive or offensive actions. Unfocused countermeasures are usually 
doomed to failure since the terrorists Will be largely unaffected. Detailed 
information on terrorists can best be obtained by clandestine human or 
- technical penetration operations. Failing this, intelligence must be 
gathered by alternate means to include (1) recruitment of informants; (2) 
Suspect surveillance; (3) police investigation of potential terrorists; 
(4) search for weapons, explosives or other incriminating evidence; (5) 
prisoner interrogation; (6) monitoring of possible targets and suspected 
terrorist supply sources; and (7) mass population education in observation 
and reporting techniques related to terrorist activity. 	- 
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To narrow the focus of the above collection operations, 
demographic data and terrorist profiles can be used to fix specific 
geographic areas where terrorists could reside and organize with some 
’ degree of relative safety. Although terrorists may operate anywhere, 
they normally maintain their residence and meeting places among dissident 
population elements who evidence negative or hostile reaction to government 
‘security forces. This fact, therefore, allows selective elimination of 
those urban and rural areas. which would not provide a hospitable terrorist 
environment. : 	2 
Physical data on roads, communication facilities, residential 
patterns, buildings and isolated areas can also be used to help determine 
likely patterns o& terrorist organizational activity within Suspect geo- 
graphic areas, Trash .collectors, building inspectors, electricians and 
other personnel with natural access can be recruited to aid collection 
of this physical information, Again, this effort further serves to pin- 
point where intelligence operations should be targetted. 
Counterintel1igence/counterespionage operations will also be 
needed to supplement the above efforts. The objective of these operations 
include (1) penetrating and manipulating terrorist cells; (2) stopping, 
disrupting, misorienting or negating terrorist intelligence collection 
activities; and (3) developing passive or specialized defenses against 
Planned terrorist acts of violence. 
In Summary, intelligence and counterintelligence operations - 
form the foundation for counterterror campaigns. Those security services 
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or personnel not familiar with essential clandestine tradecraft should 
y seek appropriate guidance and assistance. 	; 
f. Intelligence Collation - provides the detailed compilation 
and analysis of information needed to help identify, arrest and convict the 
aa _perpetrators of violence and their leaders or directors. It also facilitates 
Ff the location and elimination of terrorist support mechanisms and other hard target 
. To function effectively, any collation center must have access 
to all sources of information. This implies cooperation with all security 
and intelligence services using appropriate clearances, "source" protection 
_and compartmentation. In addition, the centers must have the legal right and 
“authority to pinpoint specific targets and assign collection or action requirement 
to individual government components. Without such follow-on authority, 
the collation centers become littie more than repositories of unexploited 
intelligence. 
All source information inputs should include (1) biographic 
data; (2) pertinent socio-economic, demographic and geographic publications; 
‘(3) details on transportation, communi cations and material resources; (4) 
target assessments; (5) analysis of terrorist organizations and modus 
operandi; and (6) all reporting on criminals, dissidents, radicals, sub- 
versives or terrorists. After collecting every scrap of available information, 
trained analysts then collate data with the objective of developing inves- 
t ative and target leads and detailed target folders for use by the operating 
~ The primary advantage to central collation i s simply that all 
. available pieces of an investigative puzzle are laid before personnel 
experienced in the art of formulating a composite intelligence picture 
which provides the sharpest available detail on any terrorist organization. 
If this collation process is absent or fragmented, any intelligence product 
cannot be properly exploited and subsequent counterterror activities may 
be expected to be largely ineffective. It is, therefore, imperative 
that any government targetted by terrorists seek to establish the best 
possible intelligence collation system. 
g. Security Force Requirements - generally include (1) 
aspect of official personnel and physical facilities; (2). riot control, 
bomb disposal and population protection from acts of violence; (3) 
enforcement of law and order; (4) preparation for national defense against 
‘internal or external acts of aggression; (5) investigation leading to 
location, arrest and conviction of criminals, dissidents, subversives or * 
terrorists; and (6) other actions required to resist lawlessness, violence, 
subversion and warfare originating within or outside the state. 
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The conduct of counterterror operations burden police forces 
with the requirement to provide the population freedom from fear and violence, 
while undertaking legal investigation which will ultimately result in con- 
viction and punishment of terrorists after “due process". As previously 
stated, the foundation for this effort is based upon adequate intelligence 
collection which may be a primary or secondary function of various security 
services. 
“Once, intelligence leads are provided, the lengthy and arduous 
process begins to obtain sufficient evidence for a court trial which will 
attempt to prove the suspect terrorist guilty of accomplished or planned 
crimes of violence. This requirement demands the skilled and extensive 
application of modern criminal investigation. It is, therefore, essential 
that police or other security forces be provided with adequate authority, 
leadership, manpower, funds, training and equipment needed to accomplish 
the task. 
Defensive terror and other repressive acts can be covertly or 
overtly undertaken by government security forces to avoid massive investi- 
gative requirements. However, both covert and overt actions present the 
definite possibility that populations concerned will become agitated with 
their government. Further, some elements may actually sympathize with or 
support terrorist organizations because of illegal acts of repression. 
(See comments on defensive terror.) Illegal acts of repression by 
government or "private" elements are generally counterproductive in the 
long run and should be avoided. 	am 
Under most circumstances, it is recommended that target 
governments seek whatever resources deemed necessary to upgrade security 
forces and give them-the capability to deal with terrorists by acting 
within existing legal paramders. Even though this is often the most 
difficult course of action, it has proven to be the most successful. 
h. Population Mobilization - is initiated by advising and 
informing the target nation's citizenry of the nature of any terrorist 
threat and motivating mass popular participation in negating acts of 
violence. To accomplish this objective, the populace should be organized 
_and instructed in the techniques of aiding security forces in the identi- 
fication of possible terrorists and otherwise assisting in their 
apprehension. 
The latter may be accomplished by launching an aggressive 2. 
educational- program designed to establish citizen procedures for reporting 
suspicious activities or personalities that are observed by local 
inhabitants. Carried to its ultimate conclusion, each village and 
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| city block would have resident protection committees with direct commu- 
u- nications to local police forces. Possible investigative leads would 
thus be immediately relayed for exploitation by security forces. 
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The unique advantage of such citizen participation is based 
on the fact that local residents are most keenly aware of unusual events 
a or the appearance of strangers in their neighborhoods. Another obvious 
i benefit is the increase in the number of eyes and ears that terrorists 
will be forced to avoid. 
a 
Actual techniques of population mobilization will vary 
according to environmental situations and citizens receptivity or moti- 
vation. Procedural approaches are the same as for so-called "block 
warning systems." As stated in the introductory note, implementation 
should not be attempted prior to consultation with appropriate specialists. 
7. dJudcial Base - is created by formulating those laws which 
support fully security forces in their conduct of counterterror operations. 
In addition, such laws should insure that all efforts are politically, 
legally and morally justifiable. This is particularly true of methods 
used to arrest, detain, interrogate, try, convict and imprison or execute 
indivi yal members of a terrorist movement, as well as to search suspected 
. As previously stated, populations are not likely to support 
fully and consistently any government that engages in brutal, repressive, 
tllegal or indiscriminate actions, regardless of the intended target. 
&. 
Sabotage 
The essential purpose of sabotage is effective disruption of the 
economic-political-security activities within a state whose government 
is targetted for ruin or overthrow. It is a tactic that may be employed 
by urban guerrillas and terrorists, or by specialized "cells" of saboteurs. 
Fundamental objectives include (1) reduction of agricultural and indus- 
trial production; (2) impeding the effective functioning of essential 
services such as communication, transportation and utilities; and/or (3) 
- limiting the conduct of various government activities with emphasis on 
internal security services and political machinery. 
Most sabotage is based upon covert destruction attack using explo- 
sives, combustibles, abrasives or subtle disruptive action. Other 
_ methods include (1) mechanical breakage; (2) use of damaging chemicals; 
(3) arson; (4) electronic interruptions; (5) pilferage of vital components; 
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4 (6) dissemination of incorrect information, falsification of data, mis- 
iy filing and records manipulation; (7) tampering; (8) fatal “flawing" of 
i. materials or equipment; (9) work slowdowns; (10) interruption of command 
or control procedures; and (11) use of laws, courts, and parlimentary 
rules to impede the effective functioning of government. 
The extensive employment of various sabotage techniques affords 
the revolutionary with a relatively secure and inexpensive weapon that 
can have disastrous consequences on the economy and security of a state. 
Further, the systematic employment of sabotage erodes public morale 
and confidence in government while advertizing the success and apparent 
invincibility of subversive forces. 
“Proof of sabotage is frequently difficult since the ultimate —_ 
target may not be apparent, and specific evidence destroyed in the act 
of destruction. Individual saboteurs will frequently maintain the cover 
of a normal life and commit their disruptive actions during the course 
of regular work or trawl. It is for this reason that sabotage jis such a 
potent revolutionary tactic. Fortunately, saboteurs have a general 
tendency to become overly confident or aggressive, thereby exposing them- 
selves. The lack of rigid compartmentation may stimulate the use of 
' - . saboteurs for violent acts which unnecessarily expose their cover. In 
"addition, saboteurs may be asked or forced to provide their own sabotage 
materials, thereby risking identification during procurement activities. 
Effective control of saboteurs requires a combination of psycho- 
logical and terrorist control systems discussed in the previous sections. 
These techniques must be supplemented by extensive security procedures 
for industry, communication and transportation facilities, government 
offices, or other lucrative targets. Emphasis is placed on physical 
protection, repetitive screening of personnel, and strict control of 
potential sabotage materials. If such systems still fail to deter the 
saboteur, it may be necessary to install television monitors to observe 
all human activity in the area of critical targets, Further, a rotating 
"buddy system" can be used to assure that individual saboteurs are con- 
stantly observed by a fellow worker. 
In sum, effective prevention of sabotage is a difficult but not 
i impossible task. Governments confronted with this problem will need 
i to seek further guidance and assistance on implementation of plant and 
i - physical security procedures. Moreover, they must recognize that they are 
ealing with a movement which is conspiratorial in nature and organization. 
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{| Propaganda _and Agitation 
In order to be successful, most subversive movements must convince 
a majority of a target population that the conditions under which they 
exist are intolerable. This attitude will then provide the motivation 
and "cause" needed to stimulate the popular dissidence essential to 
ruining or overthrowing any government. 
4 ‘ Propaganda comes in many and varied forms to include (1) leaflets; 
: * (2) letter campaigns; (3) wall slogans; (4) rumors; (5) oratory; and 
i" radio, newspapers or other media. However, the latter forum exists only 
J where free speech is guaranteed or for low-level efforts which might not 
i be supressed. 	: 
Agitation is usually accomplished by influence agents who seize 
upon controversial issue to "inflame" specific audiences for the purpose 
of stimulating the development of particular attitudes, actions or 
reactions. These individuals usually focus their attention on labor, 
student or other population organizations that have banded together because 
of common interests they wish to protect or promote. By identifying 
with their cause, the agitator can thus sek to exploit any known grievance. 
Once again, the previously discussed psychological control systems 
afford on effective means to negate the influence of subversive-sponsored 
agitation and propaganda. The most important technique being the guarantee 
of credible, institutional and constitutional processes for non-violent reso-__ 
“lution of conditions that any population segment conceives*as being, intolerable 
To enhance the above, government should advertize merits of its 
own efforts to institute reform and constructive change. They must 
discredit the subversives and prove that government will and can overcome _ 
major problems while defeating the urban guerrillas within established 
parameters of law and order. 	; 
Any government also has the option of silence or direct counter- 
propaganda activities. Leaflets can be discredited, manipulated or answered, 
Letter campaigns may be countered by confusing the issues, mail censor- 
_ ship, and letters containing alternative opinions. Wall slogans can 
be painted out, sand-blasted or sometimes manipulated by adding or sub- 
-tracting letters and words. Rumors can be distorted, discredited or 
burried in an avalanche of other rumors. Oratory is negated by argumen- 
tative oratory. Media owners can usually be influenced or pressured to 
avoid "playing" issues giving credibility to the subversive cause. 
Additionally, government can effectively utilize various media to convey 
its counterpropaganda message. 
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Agitator activity may be observed by low-level informants recruited 
from among those organizations or institutions the former is attempting to 
influence. Specific agitators can then be harassed, surveiled, detained 
or arrested until they cease and desist their activity. The government 
can also recruit their own agents of influence to be targetted against 
potential dissident groups. These individuals act as counteragitators 
who attempt to "dampen" subversive attitudes or actions, and convince 
their audiences to seek desired changes by legal and peaceful means. This 
. latter approach, of course, assumes that government is not repressive and 
has provided some basis for reform. 
Armed Violence 
Snipers or "firing groups" of four or five men may undertake limited 
hit and run attacks to erode popular confidence in government security 
forces and to force the initiation of repressive acts antagonistic to a 
target populace. Weapons include rifles, shotguns, pistols, grenades, 
Molotov cocktails, explosives and other light-weight, easily concealable 
items. Targets may be discriminately or indiscriminately selected. 
Police, firemen, government officials, foreign diplomats or businessmen 
and leaders of moderating forces are high on the discriminate list. 
Indiscriminate targets are usually selected to incite population fear. 
These armed action groups may also be used to undertake robbery, kid- 
napping, assassination or other select activity in support of overall 
subversive objectives. 	“4 
In the urban environment, such guerrilla action is at close 
quarters for extremely short duration. Specific, tactics will depend 
on the target, the metropolitan terrain, attack options, movement 
alternatives, type of. weapons, accepted modus operandi and the potential 
for surprise/retreat. The net effect being a great diversification of 
tactical approach from one situation to another. 
The sniper or armed guerrilla squad often appear to have little 
_ distinction from terrorists; however, the latter are usually limited 
to covert acts of assassination and bombing. Whereas the so-called 
.“fire teams" engage in more overt and flagrant hostilities that 
separate them from the normal terrorists. A basic difference in tactics 
‘also necessitate handling the two groups separately. 
Effective intelligence collection and collation or other tech- 
niques discussed under terrorist control may aid the apprehension and 
arrest of snipers or members of fire teams. However, defeat of these 
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| particular urban. guerrilla components will require a major effort on 
the part of internal security forces. 
i 	Snipers are a specialized problem in themselves. The instant 
a a sniper opens fire, the police and/or other security elements must 
4 have the immediate capability to “cordon" the fire zone and safely 
7 remove all civilians or other targets enclosed within. Security 
i forces must then utilize available protective cover while moving to 
J _ locate, encircle and entrap the sniper. Any counterfire should be 
fo” - undertaken only by skilled marksmen using high-powered rifles with 
& scopes. Massive amounts of uncontrolled firepower only serve to 
| endanger civilians and property while providing the sniper with addi- 
tional targets. Terrain advantage may be achieved by use of multi-storied 
buildings or helicopters. The overall objective being to quickly and 
efficiently eliminate the sniper while protecting the populace and 
avoiding any retaliatory action which could serve the guerrilla cause. 
Fire teams are the urban guerrillas’ paramilitary arm and must 
usually be countered by employment of basic counterguerrilla tactics. 
Police and other internal security elements will need the type of 
training, arms, equipment, communication and mobility that will prepare 
them to undertake such action. This normally will involve some funda- 
mental changes in the organization and deployment of all internal 
security forces. An “initial reaction force" may be composed of 
specially augmented police squads that are strategically deployed 
throughout the urban target area. These units should be capable of 
momentary response to any guerrilla attack and they must be* prepared 
to immediately engage guerrilla fire groups in a street battle. How- 
ever, counteraction must be delayed until such time as the civilian 
populace has been lead to escape from the fire zone. 
. Reserve units should be created to provide a backup for the 
initial reaction forces. The reserve is normally composed of police 
companies or specially trained military organizations held on a stand- 
by basis. Such units can be called in to cordon and search an area or 
they may be deployed to directly engage guerrilla elements. It is 
also essential that military reserve forces be prepared to react against 
HY 7 a series of widely dispersed guerrilla actions designed to overwhelm 
( ‘the police. 
hi , ’ Assassination and Kidnapping 
; _ The urban guerrillas may employ assassination and/or kidnapping 
| operations to eliminate "key" leaders within government or the private 
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sector. Liquidation of existing leadership is the oldest method of. 
revolution and affords a relatively simple means to dislocate or dis- 
organize political-social-economic institutions. 
Targets may be limited to "heads" of state, representatives of 
government, local leaders, or other individuals who act to support the 
status quo. The primary aim of a systematic campaign of assassination is 
to alienate a populace from their government by establishing the omni- 
_ potent power of the guerrillas. Kidnapping operations may also be 
designed to accomplish this same objective, and to extract concessions, 
capture publicity, provoke controversy or free political prisoners. 
Targets for kidnapping may also include foreign diplomats or business 
executives and various personalities who might be useful for propaganda 
purposes. In some cases, the kidnap victim may be executed after his 
usefulness has ended, so the net effect is that of a combined kidnapping 
and assassindion. 
Individuals or select three- to five-man guerrilla teams are 
usually employed to conduct the above types of operations. Normally, 
-guch individuals are selected on the basis of their proven courage, 
dedication, resourcefulness and cunning. Preferably, they are not 
persons wanted by the authorities, but ordinary citizens capable of 
moving about freely. Assassinations or kidnappings are planned in 
detail and special surveillance parties first check on the movements 
of propective vistims. The target is shadowed to learn his habits, 
hours, movement patterns and usual security procedures. When a pattern 
is established, the guerrillas then develop and rehearse their specific 
modus operandi. 	: 
To counter the threat of assassination or kidnapping, all potential 
targets must be advised to constantly vary their routes of movement and 
patterns of activity. Prospective security procedures should be devised 
for all key personalities. Every effort must be made to avoid unneces- 
sarily exposing potential targets. When they must be exposed, threatened 
subjects should not be at a specific location at the time guerrilla 
elements might expect them to be there. Special security arrangements 
may be required for routine travel between a target's home and office. 
In urban areas where a high threat exists, special buses with armed 
guards can be used to pick up and escort key leaders between home and 
office. Physical security of offices can be increased and potential 
target personalities, plus their families, may all be moved into a 
protected residential compound with fences, guards, etc. 
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Additional countermeasures include the various control systems 
Ne discussed under the previous section on terrorists. Primary emphasis 
Fe is on intelligence operations designed to identify assassins and 
% kidnappers. 	. 
Infiltration 
. The security and operational potential of an urban guerrilla 
at force is usually predicated on the quantity of intelligence obtained 
tt by successful infiltration. If police and internal security organi- 
zations can be penetrated, the guerrillas may thus be forewarned of 
actions planned against them. The infiltration of security forces was 
seen by Lenin as one of the essential preconditions for a successful 
urban uprising. Lenin's theory being that urban guerrillas would always 
be outgunned unless they neutralized the police and other security elements 
by infiltrating their own agents at all levels. 
In addition, the subversive movement cannot be expected to succeed 
unless it attacks and erodes any official programs designed to establish 
or sustain population confidence in government. To help accomplish this 
goal, the urban guerrillas will attempt to infiltrate all elements of 
the target regime. The net objective is to obtain information which 
can be used to plan disruptive or destructive attacks against socio- 
economic development projects or other programs designed to alleivate 
popular grievances. - 	4 
Select infiltration operations may be used'to obtain specific 
target intelligence, particularly as regards procurement of funds, 
‘weapons, or other supplies. Penetration agents can also provide 
information on potential targets for terrorist, sabotage, assassination 
and kidnap operations. 
Classic clandestine "tradecraft" techniques are used as the 
basis for organizing and accomplishing infiltration operations. 
We are first concerned with human penetrations and to a lesser 
degree, theft, bribery, technical penetrations and other ancillary types 
of espionage. However, the primary danger is that guerrillas may obtain 
a popular following from among elements of the population having existing 
intelligence access. This situation will then create a more spontaneous 
i flow of information which the urban guerrillas can use for protection 
or advantage. 
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Thus, a major and essential function of target government is. to 
stop, disrupt, manipulate or negate rebel intelligence operations. 
Accomplishment of this objective requires massive utilization of counter- 
intelligence procedures and police investigative techniques. The initial 
action is to identify specific agents, their guerrilla contacts, their 
couriers and courier routes, dead drops, and other communication or con- 
tact procedures. Once a subversive agent is identified, an operation 
may be carefully planned to attempt to double the agent. Failing this, 
the agent should be apprehended, interrogated, convicted and imprisoned 
according to "due process". 
An effective counterintelligence operation requires (1) trained 
espionage officers; (2) secure communication and facilities; (3) bio- 
graphic files to facilitate security clearances and name traces; (4) 
physical security and document control systems; (5) human and electronic 
surveillance; is informant nets; (7) double agents; (8) "block warning 
systems"; and 
requiring an upgrading of overall police capabilities. 
Mob Violence 
Street tactics of the urban guerrillas include the instigation and/ 
or manipulation of demonstrations, mobs, and strikes. The objective is 
to create a situation wherein peaceful protect groups can be agitated to 
participate in acts of civil disobedience or riot. 
Ge 
Agents of influence and subversive agitators may seize upon any 
popular grievance to stimulate the formation of protest groups. The 
next objective is for agitators to encourage the type of public demon- 
stration that could easily "flare" into a confrontation with police. 
Having created a proper environment, various guerrilla elements 
can infiltrate the street mobs to incite a riot or undertake acts of 
violence using the protestors for cover. 
. Guerrilla tactics are simple. Bottles, bricks, and stones can 
be hurled at police. Hasty barricades may be used to block streets. 
Business establisaments, factories and/or government buildings can be 
looted or burned. Snipers can be deployed to fire at police, hoping 
they in turn will retaliate by killing innocent members of the mob. 
When the police attempt to arrest an agitator, a larger group of urban 
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guerrillas may attempt to aid his escape. If internal security forces 
effectively contain the riot, the guerrillas will retreat along pre- 
planned avenues of escape. 
The primary objective of such group agitation is to force the 
government to take strong repressive measures, thereby further alienating 
the population. Promoting general disorder also helps to disrupt the 
economy and undermine the government. Last but not least, by organizing 
social discontent, the urban guerrillas induce the population to accept 
their leadership while demonstrating the regime's lack of authority. 
Basic ingredients for group agitation include (1) leadership 
trained in mob psychology and tactics; (2) an executive committee 
responsible for overall planning and execution; (3) propaganda efforts 
to rally public sympathy for a cause; (4) compilation and continuous 
review of exploitable grievances; (5) registration of potential dissi- 
dents; (6) study of overall environment; (7) profiling of radical 
organizations; (8) enlistment of financial and moral support; (9) 
tactical training for agitators; (10) development of community support; 
(11) recruitment of “crowd-rmoving" orators; (12) preparation of music, 
chants and slogans; (13) creation of demands and ultimatums; (14) 
planning for pivotal events designed to precipitate conflict; (15) 
public announcement of time and place for planned demonstration; (16) 
stimulation of actions to incite media coverage; and (17) encouraging 
demonstrators to participate in dramatic mass arrests. 
By effective manipulation of mob psychology, the urban guerrilla 
thus plans to push the aggrieved citizen into outright breaches of 
~ law that will lead to heightened outbursts of violence. In addition, 
all-out revolution must be rapidly precipitated or mob participants will 
lose stamina in the face of prolonged adversity. To succeed, group 
agitation must be carefully timed to coincide and "peak" with other 
guerrilla actions. 
A target government has only two types of countermeasures for 
controlling group agitation. The first is to quickly and mercilessly 
crush any protestors by use of totalitarian force. Obviously, this is 
- not feasible for any democratic society. A second option is to 
institute political and psychological control systems previously dis- 
“cussed and to prepare internal security forces for non-violent mob/riot 
control. The principal technique being to control effectively a mob 
without repressive or brutal tactics which further agitate the population 
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CONCLUSION 
' Throughout history, violence has been an integral part of the 
political process. Urban guerrillavarfare is a modern popular form 
of this activity advocated by communists and various national revolu- 
y _ tionaries. More civil and humane states have limited violence by 
i . developing the type of laws, custom, consensus and responsiveness which 
< limit the need or purpose of such hostility. However, no system has 
eliminated violence on the periphery of its consensual and support base. 
When violence remains peripheral, police powers of the state are 
usually adequate to "deal" with the problem in a manner acceptable to 
the population majority. If dissident forces are more than peripheral, 
the typical response is one of absorption, cooptation, and acceptance 
of essential reform as the basis for re-establishing a broad popular 
consensus. Those governments which fail to perceive the significance of 
popular grievance are inviting an outbreak of violence. The same is 
true for regimes that fail to move toward accommodation when they are 
unable to repress significant population demands for reform. 
Even though a subversive conspiracy may exist, it is not the 
revolutionaries or social deviates who cause the major problem. They 
are merely the tip of an iceberg which government may take repressive 
action to destroy. However, a new peak may be pushed to the surface 
by that "base" of popular dissent which originally stimulated and 
supported the initial violence. 	“ 
An urban guerrilla organization cannot be a serious threat unless 
it maintains a symbiotic relationship between themselves, as the tip 
of the iceberg, and their underwater population base. Thus, any acts 
of violence must be controlled politically as regards timing, target, 
theater of operation and precise selectivity; the primary purpose being 
augmentation of the subversive base and not annihilation of an enemy. 
In essence, the damage to a regime is incidental to political objectives. 
It is for this reason that subversive elements seek to force government 
to engage in repressive acts which will alienate the population. 
! ; The incumbent target regime must avoid use of repression and take 
those actions necessary to expand its political base commensurate with 
the threat imposed by urban guerrillas. In this regard, the age-old 
techniques of cooptation and absorption are often more important than 
security measures in dealing with the threat of violence. Hostilities 
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do not alter effectively the political process, but intensify the diffi- 
culty of coalition building to arrive at a consensual agreement that 
will create the basis for popular support. Only a totalitarian state 
has the potential for the type of complete repression that does not 
require cooptation or adaptation. The absorption of an urban guerrilla 
movement requires modification of governmental policy, which is seldom 
severe or detrimental to an existing regime if initiated during early 
stages of violence. 
In sum, we.can conclude that increased government fire power or 
external aid to a regime does not alter the political reality of the 
situation so long as subversive forces retain minimal viability. In 
the final analysis, the remediaé actions suggested in this study are 
of little value unless accompanied by enlightened political solutions. 
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