CIA: The Sovietization of the Cuban Revolution (1973)

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"THE SOVIETIZATION OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION: ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE WESTERN 
HEMISPHERE ,'' by Carmelo Mesa-Lago. World Affairs, summer of 1973 issue. 
This article is a detailed, well-documented review of the way by which the 
Soviet Union has achieved control over Cuban internal affairs, and how it has 
also brought Castro into line, at least in his public pronouncements, with 
Soviet foreign policy. 
The writer notes 1968, when Castro came out in support of the Soviet inva- 
sion of Czechoslovakia, as the beginning of the end of any real independence of 
action by Cuba, and then carefully traces how, beginning in 1970, with the 
establishment of the Soviet-Cuban Commission of Economic, Scientific and Technical 
Collaboration, the Soviets have built their own style economic and administrative 
hierarchy to protect their huge investment in Cuba. The writer cites mid-1972 
as Cuba's "point of no return"' in its dependence on the USSR. 
Although numerous statements by Cuban officials are quoted to illustrate 
Cuban repudiation of what the writer calls the '"'Sino-Guevarist" years, i.e. 
those during which Cuba was most active in trying to export its revolution, he 
also highlights those instances when Castro himself has never answered directly 
whether he has come to believe that guerrilla action is subordinate to other 
means of attaining power. 
The last section of the article outlines conditions under which there could 
be a rapprochement between Cuba and the U.S., and analyzes Castro's current 
dilemma: when he bitterly criticizes the U.S., it indicates he is concerned 
about losing power; on the other hand, when he sets conditions for negotiations, 
it is probably the result of Soviet pressure on him, to resist it: would erode 
his power even more. The announcement from Moscow, 17 December, that Brezhnev 
has decided “to postpone his visit to Cuba by at least two weeks indicates that 
the Soviets may be having second thoughts about this very issue. By attending 
the January first celebrations marking the fifteenth anniversary of Castro's 
revolution, as they orginally planned, they could have rum the risk of 
embarrassment by possible anti-American outbursts by the Cubans. 
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Cornclius W Vahle Jr. 
Managing Editor 
Theodore L. Stoddard 
Consulting Editor 
Jeannette Patrick 
Assistant Editor 
Barbara Marney 
Circulation Manager 
Editorial Board 
Franklin L. Burdette, Chairman 
Unrversity of Maryland 
Donald Armstrong 
Washington, D.C. 
James D. Atkinson 
Georgetown University 
Harold E. Davis 
Toe American University 
Roderic Davison 
The George Washington University 
Herbert §. Dinerstein 
The Jobns Hopkins University 
Stephen Horn 
California State University, Long Beach 
Ernest W. Lefever 
The Brookings Institution 
Genevieve C, Linebarger 
Washington, D.C. 
Rayford W. Logan 
Howard University 
Robert A. Lystad 
The Jobns Hopkins Untversity 
John J. Murphy 
The Catholic University of America 
William V. O’Brien 
Georgetown University 
Howard R. Penniman 
Georgetown University 
Don C. Piper 
University of Maryland 
Richard M. Scammon 
Flections Research Center 
Ronald M. Schneider 
Queens College, CUNY 
Vance L, Shiflett 
District of Columbia Teachers College 
Joseph F. Thorning 
Washington, D.C. 
Henry Wells 
University af Pennsylvanta 
Paul T. Welty 
Northeastern Hlinois State College 
L. William Zartman 
‘New York University 
36 
74 
© 
CPYRGHT 
WORLD 
AFFAIRS 
A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS 
Contents 
Articles 
The Sovietization of the Cuban Revolution: Its 
Consequences for the Western Hemisphere 
- Carmelo Mesa-Lago 
The 1972 Turkish Opium Ban: Needle in the 
Haystack Diplomacy? 
Joseph L. Zentner 
The Energy Crisis, the Middle East, and American 
Foreign Policy 
Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. 
Bilateralism in South Asia 
Shirin Tabir-Kbeli 
Book Reviews 
Cochran, Bert Harry Truman and the Crisis 
Presidency 
Franklin L. Burdette 
Penniman, Howard R. Elections in South Vietnam 
Victoria Scbuck 
Jowitt, Kenneth Revolutionary Breakthroughs and 
National Development: The Case of Romania, 
1944-1965 
Richard P. Farkas 
A 
Volume 136 	Number 1 	Summer 1973 
en 
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CPYRGHT 
CONTRIBUTORS Polk 
Carmelo Mesa-Lago is Associate Director of the Center for Latin American Studies 
and Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Pittsburgh. He has eneer 
lished three books and numerous articles on Cuba. 
Joseph L. Zentner is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of 
Southwestern Louisiana in Lafayette. He was previously on the faculty of the Uni-, 
versity of Hlouston. 
Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., is Chairman of the Department of Political Science at Louisiana 
State University, Baton Rouge. He is the author of numerous books and articles on 
American foreign policy and international relations, 	| 
Shirin Tahir-Kheli, currently an Académic Adviser at Temple University, recently 
received her Ph.D. from the University:of Pennsylvania. This article was written after 
a summer of research in Pakistan during the time of the signing of the Simla Accord, 
and after attending the Pakistan National Assembly session convened to consider 
and ratify the agreement. 
World Affairs is published quarterly in summer, fall, winter, and spring by the 
Amcrican Peace Socicty, Room 304, 4000 Albemarle Street, N.W. , Washington, 
1D.C, 20016. All correspondence Seneerning manuscripts.and books for review 	| 
should be'sent to this address. 	, 
Thesediters:of World A fjairs welcome the submission of relevant manuscripts. The 
views expressed-in ‘the various articles appearing in World Affairs arc those of the 
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*T. M. Registered, U.S. Patent Office. ; 
Copyright © 1973 American Peace Socicty. Printed in the United States of America. 
Second class postage paid at Washington, D.C. 
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Carmelo Mesa-Lago THE SOVIETIZATION CENT 
OF THE CUBAN 
REVOLUTION: 
ITS CONSEQUENCES 
FOR THE WESTERN 
HEMISPHERE 
Since Premier Fidel Castro endorsed the Soviet invasion of Czecho- 
slovakia, the USSR has played an increasing role in Cuban affairs.! 
Such influence was first manifested in the more orthodox and moderate 
foreign policy of the island which, for instance, aligned itself with the 
Russians in their ideological battle against morc radizal-leftist positions. 
Until recently Castro managed to preserve his relative independence in 
internal matters, but the serious dislocation of the Cuban economy, 
precipitated by the Premier’s futile mobilization for the ten-million-ton 
sugar harvest, put an end to that situation. He dramatically announced 
in the-summer of 1970 that the Revolution had entered into a new 
stage characterized by less idealism and more realism. 
Soviet control over the islamd’s domestic affairs has been achieved in 
various ways. Castro has delegated most economic powers to President 
Osvaldo Dorticés, a moderate whom the Soviets trust, and Carlos 
Rafael Rodriguez, chief economist, planner, minister without portfolio, 
and old-line pro-Soviet communist. The Prime Minister seems to have 
turned his energies outside the country, traveling abroad more than, 
three months in one single year (from the end of 1971 to the end of 
1972). Through an intergovernmental Soviet-Cuban Commission, con- 
trolled from the Cuban side by Rodriguez, the USSR has institu- 
tionalized her supervison over the usc of her economic and military aid 
to the island. A new wave of Soviet technicians has flooded into Cuba, 
and native personnel in charge of plants built with Sovict aid are being 
sent for training to the USSR. The Cuban economy has become even 
more integrated into the Soviet bloc through the former’s entrance into 
Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance). Castro’s concern 
over the United States-USSR détente has been appeased by Soviet 
rhetorical statements and his own realization of this new era of 
realpolitik. Cuba has dramatically reduced the exportation of the 
revolution, accepted. non-guerrilla-warfare roads to socialism, and 
assumed an increasingly compromising attitude vis-a-vis some conven- 
tional regimes in Latin America. In view of these developments and the 
United States rapprochement with China, it is somewhat surprising that 
a normalization in United States-Cuban relations has not occurred as 
yet. But it may happen in the near future if some conditions discussed 
in this article are met. 	. 
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The Increasing Soviet Tutelage over Cuba 	CPYRGHT 
In December 1970 Carlos Rafael Rodriguez led a Cuban delegation 
to Moscow for meetings with a Soviet team of economists headed by | 
Nikolai Baibakov, director of the Soviet Central Planning Board. As a | 
result of such conversations, the Soyiet-Cuban Commission of Eco- | 
nomic, Scientific, and Technical Collaboration was established. In 
February 1971 the Soviet-Cuban long-term trade and payments 
agreement for 1965-70 was temporarily extended until 1975.2 The : 
signing of a permanent trade agreement was delayed until the 
Commission had carefully studied the situation. To complete the basic 
details for the Commission’s organization, Baibakov visited Cuba in 
April and May, and Cuban Chancellor Rail Roa went to Moscow in 
June 1971.3 
The first meeting of the Commission was held in Havana early in 
September 1971. The Soviet delegation was led by the Vice President 
of the USSR Council of Ministers, Vladimir Novikov, and was | 
composed of top officials from several ministries as well as the Soviet 
ambassador to Havana. The Cuban delegation was led by Rodriguez, 
who also presided over the meetings, and was composed of top Cuban 
officials and the Cuban ambassador to Moscow. Rodriguez opened the 
meetings with an appraisal of the Soviet role in the birth and support of 
the Cuban revolution. In the same vein, Novikov reported that 
Soviet-Cuban trade in 1970 had increased by 60 percent over 1966, | 
reaching more than one billion rubles per year (about three million 
dollars daily); he also stressed the pivotal importance of Soviet oil, 
steel, and machinery for the island’s economy and listed the factories 
and plants built or repaired with Soviet aid.* 
The agenda for the meeting included the establishment of a more 
efficient system of training the Cuban personnel in charge of the 
Soviet-made plants; Cuban reports on the measures adopted to make up | 
for delays caused by the 1970 sugar-harvest mobilization in the - 
Soviet-aid construction of one electrical plant and two fertilizer plants; 
and the possibility of future Soviet cooperation in mechanizing the’ 
sugar harvest, expanding electrical capacity, and establishing a pharma- 
ceutical industry in Cuba. Premier Castro attended the signing of the | 
agreements but, unaccustomedly, did not say a word; in the official | 
picture he was standing behind Rodriguez, who was signing the 
document. The latter thanked the Soviet delegates “for their efforts in 
organizing and making more effective use of the aid provided by the 
USSR.” In the protocol, the Cubans agreed to speed the operation of 
loading and unloading Soviet vessels in Cuban ports, to accelerate the 
work at plants being built with Soviet aid, and to send to the USSR the 
technicians who would direct such plants. The USSR promised to send 
Cuba a new sugar-cane harvester designed jointly by engineers from 
both countries and to provide technical aid for Cuba’s attempt to 
produce its own harvesters locally on a large scale, with tests, supervised | 
by Soviet experts, to be conducted on both machines during the 1972 
harvest. Nothing concrete was agreed to on new electrical and 
pharmaceutical plants.$ 
nounced 
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At the end of October 1971 Premier Kosygin visited Cuba. He had 
reviously been in Havana in June 1967 on his return to Moscow from 
is Glassboro meeting with President Johnson. This was at a time when 
toviet-Cuban relations were deteriorating; the important dignitary 
leceived a cool official reception and little attention from the Cuban 
‘ress. In contrast, his second visit was heralded with great fanfare and 
elations were very cordial. In a meeting with Castro the Soviet Premier 
together with comrade 
ame to a quick understanding with him.” Castro replied: ‘One way to o 
"express our gratitude to the USSR for their great aid is to extract the 
maximum out of the Soviet equipment, to use it efficiently, and to 
keep it in running condition.””? There was a communique signed by 
both Premiers, in which Castro fully endorsed Soviet foreign policy 
while Kosypin condemned the United States’ “illegal holding” of the 
Guantanamo base and invited his colleague to visit the USSR.® 
While visiting Chile in December 1971 Castro was publitly asked 
whether there were any “contradictions” in the relations between Cuba 
andthe ssocialist countries. He acknowledged that there had been 
contradictions ‘‘at times” and, recanting past statements, said that they 
had been partly due to Cuban sdealism.2 Almost at the same time, in a 
meeting held in Moscow between President Dorticds and Secretary 
| Brezhnev, the former stated that Cuba was ‘“‘creating the foundations of 
socialism’? while the latter reported on the “progress made in the 
construction of communism in the USSR.” Thus Cuba acknowledged 
being at the bottom of the Soviet-invented four-step ladder to full 
communism, two step$ below her protectors. This was a repudiation of 
Cuba’s heretical proclamations during the Sino-Guevarist years of 
1966-70 that she was building communism and was ahead of the USSR 
in the development of consciousness, communist ownership, and 
egalitarian distribution.!° Dorticds also expressed his gratitude ‘‘for the 
public recognition by the Soviet Union of the significance of the Cuba 
Revolution with respect to the liberation movements in Lati 
America.” This subservient attitude would have been inconceivablq 
during the 1960s when the Cubans attempted to lead the Third-World 
revolutionary movement, thus challenging the Soviets. Once thi 
“conflicts” between the two countries had been overcome, Kesygin wap 
willing to announce that conversations had begun on the signing of } 
trade agreement for 197 2-75 that would replace the old 1965-79 
agreement provisionally exten ed (see below).!! In the meantime, the 
extended old agreement was 
international price of sugar was above the 6.11 cents per pound paid tp 
Cuba by the USSR. In December 1 	id’ 7. qr 
pound for 270,000 tons of sugar bought from Brazil, the archenemy qf 
Cuba.” 
The extent to which Cuba has departed from Sino-Guevarism and 
moved toward Soviet orthodoxy is evident in the treatment given 
the Cuban press to Nixon’s visit to China vis-a-vis his visits to Mosco 
and Warsaw in 1972. Reports of Nixon’s visit to China were cleverly 
manipulated by the Cuban press to criticize the Chinese. In one issuc bf

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newspaper Granma, the front page was divided into two 
halves: the top half contained news and photos of the United States 
bombing of Vietnam while the bottom half had photos of Nixon 
shaking hands with Mao and Chou En-lai. The newspaper also 
reproduced excerpts of the friendly toasts exchanged between Nixon 
and Chou, and its last page was full of photos with ironic comments, !3 
In contrast, Nixon’s visits to Moscow and Warsaw were reported 
factually (taken from ASS), although very briefly and not in 
prominent places, but without any type of evaluation or comment.'4 
The second meeting of the Soviet-Cuban Commission was held in 
Moscow in April 1972, with Rodriguez as head of the Cuban delegation 
and Novikov as president of the meeting. At that meeting the results of f 
the tests made during the 1972 sugar crop of the various types of cane 
harvesters were probably evaluated. (Significantly, in June the USSR 
announced that a factory to build the model sponsored by the Soviets 
would be sent to Cuba.) The Commission agreed to supply Cuba with 
an electronic computer to help in economic planning, thus strengthen- 
ing Rodriguez’ position in favor of a more technical and powerful 
central planning apparatus. Other topics discussed were the mechaniza- 
tion and modernization of ports (the inefficiency of loading and 
unloading Soviet ships had been on the agenda of the first meeting), 
civil aviation, irrigation, hydroelectric energy, a pharmaceutical in- 
dustry, education, and communications. Rodriguez decorated Novikov 
with the medal of the Cuban Academy of Science and met with 
Kosygin:!5 
‘Although the subject of military aid was not included in either of the 
two agreements of the Commission, events in 1972 showed that this 
was on the agenda. Early in January the Cuban Navy received several 
Soviet missile-carrying launches that doubled its missile and antiaircraft 
equipment.'® In April the Air Force, in turn, received a flotilla of 
MIG-23’s, the most technologically advanced Soviet aircraft, which 
modernized the Cuban stock of MIG’s 15, 17, 19, and 21. For several 
months a team of hundreds of Soviet military experts led by Lt. 
General Dimitri Krutskikn had been training Cuban personnel in the use 
of this equipment.” 
On May 2, 1972, Castro began a trip to Africa and Eastern Europe 
which lasted 63 days, longer than all of his previous trips abroad put 
together. Before taking off, the Premier said: “Only a few years ago 
none of us would even dream of being outside of our country for too 
long, considering the way the imperialists were acting, with all their 
threats. Fortunately things are different now.”"® Castro was no longer 
afraid of the possibility of a United States direct or sponsored invasion, 
but he was concerned about the Soviet commitment to a rapproche-- 
ment with the United States, which was manifested by the fact that 
Nixon’s decision to blockade North Vietnamese ports and escalate the 
bombing of the North did not impede his visit to Moscow. In Castro’s 
mind Cuba and Vietnam are in a similar position; thus, he devoted a 
large portion of his speeches in Eastern Europe to attacking the United 
States and pledging solidarity with the Vietnamese. In his speech on 
arriving in Poland—Nixon had just left—Castro pointed out that his 
~ 
CPYRGHT

eaiiiiailimmetl 
Brezhnev rhetorically resporided to Castro’s pressure by condemning 
the United States blockade and bombing of North Vietnam as well as 
the United States occupation of the Guantanamo base in Cuba and by 
assuring the Cuban Premier that the policy of peaceful coexistence 
would not weaken the ideological struggle, that the confrontation 
between capitalism and communism would become more acute, and 
that small socialist nations would be defended and treated equally by 
the Soviet superpower. Apparently satisfied, Castro said that for twelve 
years the United States had exerted pressure on Cuba to break her ties 
with the USSR but that, instead, the relations and confidence between 
the two countries had consolidated, reaching a level never attained 
before. Then he pledged that Cuba would never accept “opportunism, 
neutralism, revisionism, liberalism, or capitalist ideological penetra- 
tion.” One wonders whether this statement was 4 betrayal of his 
subconscious hope that the USSR would abstain from such vicious 
practices. 
Castro’s trip also made evident his new, more compromising attitude 
toward other countries. Four or five years earlier Castro had strongly 
criticized Houari Boumédienne for overthrowing Ben Bella. Now Castro 
began his trip with a stay in Algeria of nine days, equal to the time he 
later spent in the USSR. (Algeria was followed by six days in 
revolutionary Guinea and one day in traditional Sierra Leone.) Castro 
had also earlier sorted friend from foe by the country’s prevailing 
antagonism toward the USSR; hence, Rumania had been very high in 
his esteem. Now the length of his stay in each of the Eastern European 
countries was positively correlated to their orthodoxy and good 
standing with Moscow: nine days in the USSR, cight in East Germany 
and Bulgaria, seven in Poland and Hungary, five in Czechoslovakia, and 
only four in Rumania. 
Rodriguez joined Castro for the Eastern European stage of his trip, . 
replacing Major Juan Almeida, a black, who was an asset in the African 
stage of the trip. (Some members of the Cuban delegation who werc 
unacceptable to the USSR also returned to Havana.) Both the Cuban 
and the Eastern European news media ranked Rodriguez second in the 
Cuban delegation; he was decorated in several countries; and in the 
Moscow meetings he, Castro, Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny met 
alone. Rodriguez was shown in photos at important meetings; he 
apparently was taking care of the serious business. During the trip 
Castro did all that he could to build up his image. He submitted to 
unaccustomed formalities such as wearing a necktie to receive the 
Dimitrov Order in Bulgaria and the Lenin Order in Moscow, and a cap 
and gown in his investment as Doctor honoris causa at Charles 
University in Prague. He visited dozens of factories and farms even in 
remote areas, played football with Bulgarians and basketball with Poles, 
and often mixed with the population. Castro’s visit to the USSR was 
originally scheduled for three weeks but lasted only nine days. When 
leaving the country, the Prime Minister said that he would return in 
1973 or 1974 “for a more extended unofficial visit.” Rodriguez stayed 
in Moscow for a few days after Castro left, preparing a significant 
announcement. 
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officially requested Cuba’s entrance into the organization, and its eight 
Servers unanimously accepted.'? Rodriguez promised to eliminate 
“once and for all” the instability of the Cuban supply of sugar to the 
socialist camp and requested entry into the Intergovernmental 
Commission of Socialist Countries for the Development of Electronic 
Computation. In turn, Kosygin stated that the needs of the Cuban 
economy should be coordinated with the 1976-80 plans of Comecon 
‘ members. ?° 
In the West there was the impression before Castro’s trip that neither 
he nor the Soviet leaders were eager for Cuba’s entrance into 
Comecon.”? After the step was taken, it was speculated that Cuba’s 
admission could be a Soviet concession to give guarantees to Castro that 
Moscow’s improved ties with Washington would not be to the 
detriment of the Caribbean island.?? But if this were the case and 
Castro had a vested interest in getting such a “concession,” why did he 
not stay in Moscow five more days to make the request himself? 
Probably what he wanted was Cuba’s admittance into the Warsaw Pact, 
but this was too much to ask of the Soviets because it might have 
jeopardized their delicate new détente with the United States. It is 
doubtful that Cuba’s entrance into Comecon will bring any significant 
advantage to the island; and, conversely, it may result in less flexibility 
in Cuban economic plans, now to be coordinated with those of the 
seven Eastern European nations (and Mongolia!). Personally, this step 
will reduce Castro’s power in econémics even more and strengthen that 
of Rodriguez. The USSR seems“to be the main winner with its 
increased control over the island’s economy and, probably, a 
distribution of the Cuban economic burden among Comecon mem- 
bers. 
Cuban dependence on the USSR seemed to have reached a point of 
no return in 1972. Some 60 percent of Cuban trade was with the 
Soviets, approximately the same proportion it used to be with the 
United States in the 1950s.73 Cuba had also systematically failed to 
mect her sugar export commitments with the Sovicts, thereby building 
in 1965-72 a cumulative deficit of about 20 million tons of sugar, the 
equivalent of three good sugar crops.% According to Soviet sources, the 
island’s cumulative trade deficit with the USSR for 1960-70 amounted 
to 1.5 billion dollars; but Cuban statistics indicate that the figure was 
above two billion dollars.?* Due to Cuba’s bad sugar and tobacco crops 
of 1971-72, such trade deficit may have increased to three billion 
dollars by 1972.7 The total debt of Cuba to the USSR in that year was 
probably close to the four billion dollar mark if the annual repayment 
of loans plus interest, shipping costs, and the cost of maintaining Soviet 
technical and military advisors are added. It has been reported that the 
National Bank of Cuba estimates that half of such debt could have been 
saved if Cuba had traded with market economies.’ Cuba’s merchant 
marine, despite its remarkable growth in the last decade, carried only 
seven to eight percent of the island trade, most of which was handled 
by Soviet vessels.?2* The USSR gave Cuba $1.5 billion in military aid 
until 1971; and although, apparently, she did not charge for it, she has 
gained substantial control in the Een of such equipment. In the

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key positions have been and are being trained in the USSR. 	PYRGHT 
In the 1960s conflicts between the USSR and Cuba were generated , 
by several causes. Cuba often felt treated in a neo-colonial manner bya 
big power. The first serious confrontation occurred in 1962 when the 
USSR agreed with the United States, without consulting Cuba, to 
withdraw the missiles that created the October crisis. Six years later 
Castro accused the “developed socialist countries” of using commercial 
practices similar to those employed by the capitalist countries and 
specifically denounced the USSR for restricting its oil supplies to Cuba, 
thus obstructing the ldeter’s development. Other points of friction 
resulted from divergent doctrinal stands; thus, in 1966-68 (when 
Sino-Guevarism was in; vogue) Castro imputed the Soviets with 
neglecting ideological consciousness and political awareness for the 
development of the material base and with introducing economic 
reforms that pushed them back to capitalism.*° 
In his speech of July 26, 1972, the Cuban Prime Minister showed 
how his dependence on the Soviets had forced him to retreat from his 
previous positions. He said that Cuban-Sovict relations were “based on 
principles and doctrine.” Castro also reported that since his 1964 visit 
an impressive Sovict progress had occurred in technology, economics, 
and science, and in the citics, and stated that this development of the 
material base had been paralleled by the achievement of a “‘tremendous 
political awareness”: “‘It is an unquestionable fact that imperialist 
ideology, propaganda, and corruption have not succeeded in gaining a 
tochold anywhere in the Soviet Union... . Marxism-Leninism lives on 
there, [it] is the daily bread of the Soviet people.” Finally he stated 
that the Sovict leadership had “deep feelings of solidarity, affection, 
and respect” for the Cuban people and that they, in turn, were “proud 
to have the priceless, disinterested, and revolutionary” friendship of the 
USSR: “The economic relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union 
- have been the most gencrous and the most revolutionary 
possible .... Relations of this kind used to be unknown in the history 
of relations among nations.... Though the world of tomorrow will 
change, our friendship with the Soviet people will remain a constant 
and our gratitude will be eternal.””*? 
In November 1972 there was an important reorganization of the top 
Cuban government apparatus: an Executive Committee with power 
above the Council of Ministries (J UCEPLAN—Junta Central de 
Planificacién) was established, composed of ten Deputy Prime Ministers 
with direct control over sectors of the economy, cach one grouping 
several central ministrics and agencies. Castro became the President of 
the New Executive Committee and retained the Premiership of the 
Council of Ministries and control over several ministries and agencies, 
principally the armed forces and internal security. But, obviously, there 
was some delegation of his previously omnipotent power. Rodriguez 
was appointed Deputy Minister of Foreign Policy with control over the 
Soviet-Cuban Commission and all foreign relations. President Dorticos 
was given control over JUCEPLAN (junta Central de Planificacion), 
the Ministries of Forcign Trade and Labor, the National Bank and other 
minor agencies.>? Nevertheless, Rodriguez’s control over the foreign 
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, this 
ministry is headed by Marcelo Fernandez, a follower of Rodriguez's 
economic thought) and expertise in planning a de facto control over 
JUCEPLAN. 
The Soviet-Cuban Commission, Cuba’s entrance into Comecon, the 
strengthening of the former’s planning apparatus, and the increasing 
influence of Rodriguez and other technocrats trusted by the USSR 
assured the latter that the island would use Soviet aid more efficiently, 
follow a more orthodox and rational economic policy, and do her best 
to honor her export commitments in the future. And yet Cuba’s 
accumulated debt was of such a colossal magnitude that it put in 
jeopardy the new economic strategy. Important concessions were 
necessary to allow such strategy to consolidate, bear fruit, and eradicate 
the negative image of Cuba’s poor economic performance which had 
been so embarrassing for the Soviets all over the world and, 
particularly, in Latin America. 
In December 1972 Castro and Rodriguez returned to Moscow, 
having been invited to participate in the festivities of the 50th 
anniversary of the founding of the USSR. At the plenary meeting of the 
anniversary, in a final political concession, Castro cited the Soviet 
“single multinational state’’ as a model for a “Latin American socialist 
community.” The next day he and Brezhnev signed five economic 
agreements through which the USSR made the following important 
commitments: (1) stipulation for 1973-1975 of higher prices for Cuba’s 
two main export items—sugar (an increase from 6.11 to 11 cents per 
pound) and nickel; (2) technical aid in 1973-1975 (at a value of 300 
million rubles) to mechanize the sugar harvest; to repair, modernize 
and/or expand nickel, electricity, oil-refining, textile, and metallurgic 
installations; and to help in planning and electronic computation (this 
credit will be paid in 1976-2000); (3) deferment for 13 years of the 
payment of the Cuban debt to the USSR (both principal and interest) 
accrued in 1960-1972 (payments will be made in 1986-2011); (4) 
grancing of the necessary credit to compensate for the expected Cuban 
deficit in the balance of payments in 1973-1975 with the Sovicts 
(probably about one billion rubles) under the same payment conditions 
as in number 3; and (5) a “three-year (1973-1975) trade agreement 
(details were not given).*4 
The third meeting of the,Soviet-Cuban Commission was held in 
Havana in February-March 1973 to implement the new economic 
agreements signed in Moscow: Rodriguez, the head of the mecting, 
opened it with praise to the USSR for the concessions made. No further 
information was made public.3* The numerous concessions made by 
Cuba since 1970 had finally paid economically but the island 
dependency upon the USSR was greater than ever before. 
Cuba’s Realpolitik with Latin America 
The Organization of American States (OAS) agreed in January 1962 
to expel Cuba from the interamerican system, alleging that it was 
incompatible with Cuba’s self-proclaimed socialism and Marxism- 
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OAS, responding to evidence presented by Venezuela of a Cuban-armed CPYRGHT 
expedition, agreed to cut diplomatic, economic, and transportation 
links with Cuba. At the time only Mexico, Chile, and Uruguay opposed 
the sanctions, but eventually the last two countries accepted the OAS 
decision. Cuba resorted to increased aid to support revolution in Latin 
America as the only way to break her isolation in the hemisphere. In 
addition, in 1966-67, Che Guevara, Regis Debray, and Castro pro- 
claimed the dogma that the rural guerrilla foce a fa Cuba was the only 
road for revolution in Latin America. 
In the late 1960s three events induced Cuba to stop sending armed 
expeditions abroad and to reduce dramatically her aid to Latin 
American guerrillas and revolutionary movements: the death of Che 
Guevara and the concomitant failure of his guerrillas in Bolivia (as well 
as previous failures in Argentina, Guatemala, Peru, and Venezucla); the 
deterioration of the Cuban economy which forced an inward concentra- 
tion of all the nation’s resources and efforts; and the rapprochement 
with the USSR, which allowed the latter to exert pressure on Cuba to 
normalize her relations with Latin America.*° Early in 1970 the 
Venezuelan guerrilla leader Douglas Bravo accused Castro of abandon- 
ing continental revolution for consolidating socialism in his own 
country, as Stalin had done in the USSR in the 1930s. The Premier 
answered, defending his nation’s “right and duty” to improve her 
economy, and witrned that, in the future, guerrilla fighters would have 
to meet Cuban criteria to receive aid.37 Since 1970 very little or 
nothing has been hvard from the Latin American Solidarity Organization 
(OLAS), founded in Havana in 1967 to promote continental revolution. 
There are occasional reassurances in Castro’s speeches that Cuba is still 
supporting the revolution in Latin America, but these seem rhetorical 
statements except perhaps for the training in Cuba of a selective group 
of Latin American revolutionaries. 
In trying to break her hemispheric isolation and under pressure from 
the USSR, Cuba has become increasingly compromising with the 
socio-economic-political systems of other Latin American countries, 
first accepting the “progressive military,” then ‘democratic socialism,” 
and finally conventional military and representative democracies. In 
mid-1969 Castro had sect three preconditions in order for Latin 
American countries to restore relations with Cuba: (a) rejection of the 
OAS sanctions; (b) condemnation of the ‘“‘crimes” committed against 
Cuba by “Yankee imperialism’; and (c) revolution. He then said that 
Cuba would never return to the OAS and would wait as long as 
necessary (ten, twenty, thirty years) until all Latin American countries 
would revolt and establish the Organization of Revolutionary States of 
Latin America.28 Less than one year later Castro replaced all these 
preconditions with a ncw one: that the country behave independently 
from the United States.*? 
Peru was the first country that offered Cuba an opportunity to 
practice the new realpolitik when, in 1968, General Juan Velasco 
Alvarado overthrew the democratic, but weak and inefficient, govern- 
ment of Belaunde Terry, proclaimed a revolution, and nationalized the 
United States oil business. Since then Cuban-Peruvian relations have 
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A pprowenkF oe Rdteds d 19997097026 [ASRDP7SLGT194 40001008500 1-2PYRGHT 
phenomenon,” that of ‘a group of progressive military playing a. 
revolutionary role”; in 1970 generous Cuban aid was given to help the 
victims of the devastating Peruvian earthquake; in the fall of 1971 
Velasco invited a Cuban delegation to attend a mecting of the 
UNCTAD’s Group of 77 held in Lima; in late 1971 Castro made a 	° 
stopover at the Lima airport (on his way back to Cuba from Chile) and 
met Valasco; and early in 1972 Peru presented a motion at the OAS. 
requesting that its members be left free individually to reestablish 
relations with Cuba if they wanted. The motion was defeated but, in 
July, Peru reestablished relations with Cuba. 
For a brief period, umder the rule of leftist General Torres in 
1970-71, there was a chance that Bolivia would repeat the Peruvian 
example; but the military coup of conservative General Banzer in late | 
1971 closed that possibility.’ 	‘ail 
Since 1971 Cuba has been courting Panama’s military regime led by | 
General Omar Torrijos. Although he has not introduced any revolution- 
ary or significant reformist changes in his country, Torrijos, has 
challenged the United States over the Panama Canal. At the end of 
1971 two vessels under Panamanian flag were captured by the Cuban 
navy, which alleged that Panama had launched incursions against Cuba 
before and that the captain of one of the vessels (a Cuban by birth and 
a United States citizen) was a CIA agent. The U.S. government offered 
its aid to Panama and requested from Cuba the return of the vessels and | 
the captain. Castro immediately denounced this as a United States plot 
to divert Panamanian attention from the Canal and damage relations 
with Cuba. He invited Torrijos to send a plane to Havana to pick up all 
the crewmen who had not participated in acts of aggression. A | 
Panamanian delegation soon arrived, heard the confession of those 
crewmen accused by Cuba, accepted the conditions, and hailed Castro 
for respecting Panama’s sovercignty.*° In 1972 Panama supported the 
Peruvian motion at the OAS and Panamanian air force planes made 
regular trips to Cuba carrying politicians and university professors and 
students. Later in the year Torrijos followed the Cuban precedent at 
Guantanamo Base by refusing to collect the United States’ annual rent 
for the Canal Zone. The conflict over the Canal was brought by Panama 
in 1973 to the UN Security Council with strong support from Cuba, 
Peru, the USSR, and China, and against United States objections. 
During the Council meetings held in March in Panama City, General 
Torrijos condemned the embargo of Cuba, and Foreign Minister Juan 
Antonio Tack announced that Panama would recognize Cuba soon.*} | 
In 1969 the Chilean Christian Democrat government of Eduardo Frei |" . 
initiated trade exchanges with Cuba and, in June 1970, signed a 
two-year trade agreement for $11 million. Later in the year the Marxist | 
candidate of the Popular Front (Unidad Popular, composed of 
Socialists, Communists, Radicals, and a leftist split of the Christian | 
Democrats-MAPU), Castro’s friend Salvador Allende was elected | 
President. Ten days after taking office Allende reestablished diplomatic 
relations with Cuba; and early: in 1971 a new trade agreement 
(increasing the trade volume by only six million dollars) was signed by 
both countries.42 Allende and Castro exchanged visits to their 
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respective countries; the Cuban Premier’s trip took place at the end of 
1971 and lasted almost one month, while the Chilean President’s trip 
took place at the end of 1972 and lasted less than one week. 
In 1971 Castro supported Uruguay’s Popular Front (Frente Amplio) 
in that nation’s clections. This Front, more a mixed coalition than that 
of Chile, was composed of splits from the two traditional parties 
(“Blanco” and ‘‘Colorado”’), plus Communists, Socialists, and Christian 
Democrats, and was led by retired General Liber Seregni. The urban 
guerrillas, ““Tupamaros,” an illegal movement, could not participate in 
the-lections and, although manifesting doubts that they could solve 
the problem, did not oppose the Frente. Castro was greatly dis- 
appointed when the Front lost the election to the conservative 
candidate of the incumbent party. Nevertheless, the entering of military 
men into the cabinet in 1973 opened the door for potential changes 
which are carefully watched by the Cubans. 
A surprising rapprochement took place in 1971-72 between Cuba 
and the conventional government of Ecuador, led by the 78-year-old 
politician and quasi dictator Velasco Ibarra. He had not introduced a 
single revolutionary measure in his term (nor in his previous two brief 
periods as President) but seized some 50 United States fishing ships that 
had entered the unilaterally established 200-mile territorial waters of 
Ecuador. (The country is strategically important to Cuba because it is 
expected to become the second largest Latin American oil exporter by 
1974.) In the Soviet-Cuban communique released on the occasion of 
Premier Kosygin’s visit to Havana, both parties hailed Ecuador’s 
“independent posture” (as well as that of Panama). On his way back 
from Chile, Castro made a stop at Quito’s airport and met Vclasco 
Ibarra and part of his cabinet. The warming relationship was inter- 
rupted in early 1972 by a military coup that overthrew Velasco Ibarra 
(for the third time in his career!), The new military regime has been 
cautious in its statements; and, although siding in 1972 with the 
Peruvians at the OAS mecting, did not follow them in reestablishing 
relations immediately with Cuba. In March 1973, during the ECLA 
mectings held in Quito, the chief of the Cuban delegation, Rodriguez, 
met with Ecuadorian President General Guillermo Rodriguez Lara 
and the Legislative Commission. When asked by journalists if the 
reestablishment of relations -between the two countries was imminent, 
Rodriguez diplomatically said ‘‘we are not in a hurry.” 
Mexico never accepted the OAS decision to isolate Cuba. Diplomatic 
relations and small trade continued uninterrupted although several 
conflicts created tension and coolness between the two countries. Early 
in 1972 the situation apparently changed when, for the first time since 
Cuba’s revolutionary takeover, an exchange of forcign-trade missions 
took place. Cuba is interested in buying Mexican lubricants, manufac- 
tured products, and medicines (the latter suggests that the expected 
Soviet aid to develop a pharmaceutical industry in Cuba has not 
materialized) and in receiving technical experience in the industrializa- 
tion of minerals and petroleum derivatives in exchange for tobacco, 
rum, and minerals. Mexico’s Foreign Trade Bank offered to finance the 
operation and an agreement was signed in March 1973.“ 
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CPYRGHT

Jamaica and Trinidad and 
Instead of alleging that they were not bound by the 1964 OAS 
decision, the two countries abstained from establishing diplomatic and 
trade relations with Cuba. The two nations have rather conventional 
regimes, democratically elected; and at one point Trinidad and Tobago 
accused Cuba of training some of its citizens in revolutionary warfare. 
The situation changed in 1971-72, however. An exchange of trade 
missions took place between Cuba and Trinidad and Tobago in late 
1971, and a more liberal party gained power in Jamaica early in 1972. 
Both countries voted in favor of the Peruvian motion in the OAS in the 
spring of 1972, and Castro hailed them for doing so. In a conference of 
Commonwealth Caribbean leaders held in Port of Spain in October, 
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago (as well as Bardados and Guyana 
which entered the OAS in the early 1970s) decided to establish, 
diplomatic relations with Cuba and the decision was implemented in 
December 1972.%% 
The unexpected occurred in Argentina when President-Gencral 
Alejandro Lanusse quickly convoked presidential elections; these were 
freely held in March 1973 and won by the Peronist candidate Dr. 
Héctor Campora who was inaugurated as President on May 25. Cuban 
President Dorticdés was invited to the inauguration and three days later 
Argentina and Cuba reestablished diplomatic relations.*¢ 
In Central America surprising changes began to take place. At the 
end of 1972 Cuba sent wo “medical brigades” to help the victims of 
the earthquake that destroyed Managua (interestingly the same gesture 
that opened the door to the Peruvians) and they were received by the 
Minister of Public. Health.47 Cuba stated that this was an act of . 
solidarity to the suffering people of Nicaragua and did not necessarily 
mean support to Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoaa, Jr., but even 
this gesture would have been difficult to conceive three years before. 
On the other hand, Costa Rican President José figueres (another 
former archenemy of Castro) addressed in 1973 a meeting of Cuban 
exiles in Puerto Rico, advising them to be realistic (in view of the United 
States rapprochement with China) and to open themselves to the 
possibility of a rapprochement between Cuba and the United States.** 
Finally relations with Venezuela, the nation that in 1963 requested 
of the OAS the imposition of sanctions against Cuba, have improved 
considerably since 1969 as a result of a change in attitude by the 
Christian Democrat government. The first step was taken by President 
Rafael Caldera’s “pacification program” which included legalization of 
the Venezuelan communist party, amnesty to revolutionary activists 
who agreed to respect the democratic process, and relaxation of 
tensions with Cuba. In 1972 top Venezuelan officials from the 
Ministries of Education and Agriculture visited Cuba; there were 
professional, scholarship, and sport exchanges; the Cuban press agency 
Prensa. Latina was allowed to establish a branch in Caracas; and one of 
the two Cuban gucrrillas arrested in the 1963 landing was freed. Early 
in 1973 Caldera stated that the guerrillas in Venezuela had disappeared, 
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ved, OF 4. BASE = ETT UY he n 
“wa 	dad 
considerably reduced, that the normalization process between 
Venezuela and Cuba was evolving positively, that his government was 
endorsing Cuba’s entrance into international agencies (e.g., the Group 
of 77), and that, although Venczucla would not formally present the 
Cuban case in the next OAS General Assembly, the theme would be 
discussed informally. The Assembly held in April was headed by 
Venezuelan Foreign Minister Aristides Calvani who played a crucial role 
in getting approval for the new doctrine of ‘ideological pluralism” to 
accept, within the OAS, nations with divergent socio-politico-economic 
systems, including Marxist ones.*? At the same time that the OAS 
assembly was taking place the Christian Democrat presidential candi- 
date Lorenzo Fernandez ¢clections will be held in December 1973) was 
discussing in Moscow with the Soviet leaders the possibility of shipping 
oil from Venezuela to Cuba.*® In his May Day 1973 speech, Castro for 
the first time openly courted Venezuela by welcoming its.recent step to 
annul the commercial treaty with the United States and by.announcing 
that Cuba would support the Venezuclan government “regardless of its 
economic system” in case of a serious conflict with international oil 
corporations.*! 
The previous pages show that Cuba has assumed an incrcasingly 
compromising attitude vis-a-vis Latin American countries with divergent 
revolutionary stands:°? the Chilean Marxist government; a group of 
nations that have proclaimed themselves revolutionaries but are mostly 
reformist (c.g., Peru and Mexico, and probably Argentina in the future) 
or have not changed the status quo at all (as in Panama and Ecuador); 
and a group of conventional regimes that do not pretend to be 
revolutionary (c.g., Jamaica, Guyana, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, 
and Venezucla). A Hungarian journalist posed the problem to Castro 
while he was in Chile, asking him: ‘‘You have said a number of times in 
your speeches that there are many ways to achieve socialism; could you 
- give us a general picture of the Latin Amcrican scene in this respect?” 
Castro answered employing ‘“‘Cantinflas style” (the deliberately confus- 
ing and contradictory way that the famous Mcxican comedian Mario 
Moreno uses to get away from difficult situations): 
1 don’t think I ever said that there were many ways, I might have said that there 
was more than one way, which remains to be proven and, to a certain extent, is 
being proved. Also, that new variants might come up....Ilere’s a new way: the 
Chilean process. A variant which may very well sct the beginning of a process whose 
future we cannot predict, as in the case of Peru. 
A Chilean journalist tricd to get a more concrete definition from the 
Cuban Premier by asking: “In view of the experience of the last ten 
years of revolutionary struggle in Latin America do you think that the 
theory of the revolutionary nucleus [the guerrilla foco] is now 
subordinate to other forms of struggle or is that theoretical stand still 
valid?” Castro diplomatically chose to remain silent.*° 
Cuba’s compromising attitude vis-a-vis Latin American countries that 
“behave independently from the U.S.A.” has been paralleled with 
consistent verbal attacks against other military regimes (Argentina until 
May 1973, Bolivia after September 1971, Brazil, and Paraguay), 
representative democracies (Colombia, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and 
Y4AUUU LUYGOUUU 
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2 
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El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras). These are indiscriminantly 
despised as “imperialist puppets” or “Yankee lackeys.” Training of 
selective revolutionaries from some of these countries apparently 
continues; and Cuba, at least rhetorically, also claims active support to 
revolutionary forces within them. These countries (together with the 
United States) have strongly opposed a revision of the 1962-1964 OAS 
agreements. In general, the less legitimate these countries’ bases and the 
more they are maintained by repression, the stronger their opposition 
to Cuba. (Many of these countries, in. fact, have exaggerated the 
Castroite threat to get more economic and military aid from the United 
States.) The most democratic regimes have been. more flexible in this 
matter in spite of real physical attacks originated in Cuba. 
For.a decade Castro systematically rejected the possibility of Cuba’s 
returning to the OAS, abhorring it as a “putrid, revolting den of 
corruption,” a “disgusting, discredit cesspool’ and a “ministry of 
colonies of the United States.” At one point Castro said that Cuba 
would, return to the OAS only if the “imperialists and their puppets 
were kicked out first’; more recently he spoke of the substitution of 
the OAS first by the “Organization of. Revolutionary States of Latin 
America” and later: by the “Union of Peoples of Latin America.” 
(Notice that the second title, suggested in 1971, conveniently excluded 
the word ‘‘Revolutionary.”)™ 
The position of OAS officials in the matter has been an embarrassing 
one: violently rejected by Castro, strongly criticized by a minority of 
Latin American countries, and having strong opposition to change from 
-the most. authoritarian-conservative countri¢s in the area in an awkward 
marriage with the powerful United States. In November 1971, trying to 
avoid a repetition of the Chilean example (that individually reestab- 
lished relations with Cuba), the Secretary General of the OAS, Galo 
Plaza, began consultations in Mexico on the “normalization” of 
relations with Cuba. Besides the support of the openly favorable 
countries, he apparently received an endorsement from both Bolivia 
(then under leftist Tortes) and the four open-minded democratic 
countries. But the strong: opposition of conservative military regimes 
and that of the United States put an end to the move.** 
In the spring of 1971 Nixon’s overtures to China raised the 
possibility that Cuba would be next. The majority of OAS members 
became fearful of losing their scapegoat and bail for juicy United States 
aid, as Taiwan had done. The open-minded minority showed concern 
over an embarrassing Cuban-United States agreement on their backs. 
Galo Plaza hurried to ask the White House and the State Department to 
keep him, and the OAS members, informed of any changes in policy 
toward .Cuba and resumed his efforts to find a satisfactory compromise 
within the OAS framework. The Cuban Ministry of Forcign Relations 
quickly rejected any move to restore Cuba to OAS membership but 
welcomed the restoration of rclations with Latin American countries on 
an individual basis. Toward the end of the year Peru presented a motion 
at the OAS, freeing its members to make individual decisions on the 
matter, but withdrew the motion later. (Castro rejected the rumor that 
the ee incident which occurred at the time—a possible cause for the

Approve 
-Chancellor General Mercado Jorrin.** The final vote (thirteen against, 
or-Retease 1999/6 PP79=6 	6 
sabotagé thé motion.) In Peru reintroduced the motion 
which was defended at an extraordinary mecting of the OAS by 
seven in favor, and three abstentions) showed some surprises: Colombia 
and Costa Rica (reportedly favorable) voted no, and Argentina and 
Venezucla (the first reportedly against, the second in favor) ab- 
stained. *’ Castro’s strong statement from Sofia, at the same time that 
the mecting was taking place, rejecting any “‘ncutralization” of Cuba 
and endorsing the Latin American revolution (see below), could have 
affected the voting adverscly. 
The changes that occurred in Latin America in the second half of 
1972 and the first half of 1973 significantly altered the OAS voting 
pattern in the Cuban case. In April 1973 the majority of the OAS 
members accepted the new doctrine of “‘idcological pluralism’ and 
Galo Plaza stated that possibly the next General Assembly would lift 
the sanctions placed in 1964 against Cuba.*® At the time, there were in 
the OAS cleven countries solidly in favor of lifting the sanctions, six 
strongly against, and seven dubious, This was a remarkable shift in one 
year, but only eight votes (one-third of the membership) are needed to 
maintain the sanctions. Therefore, if the United States opposition 
continues and there are no significant ¢hanges in Latin Amcrica, Galo 
Plaza’s prediction may not come truc.’On May Day 1973 Castro said 
that the new doctrine of “ideological pluralism” made the 1962 OAS 
resolution (declaring the Cuban Marxist system incompatible with the 
“interamerican systcm’’) null and void. And yet he did not help to 
break the deadlock by stating that it was the OAS that was 
incompatible with Marxism-Leninism and by rejecting a return to the 
OAS unless the United States is excluded from the organization (he also 
added a new condition: that the OAS headquarters be moved to a Latin 
American country).°? Thus in mid-1973 the battle was sull between 
Havana and Washington. Is a rapprochement possible? 
The Conditions for a United States-Cuban Rapprochement 
In the late 1960s a United States-Cuban rapprochement was mainly 
the subject of intellectual discussion with a few practical overtures that 
did not produce the expected fruit. In the 1970s, however, an cra of 
realpolitik has begun, which has created better opportunities for 
negotiation: on the United States side, the understanding with China, 
agreements with the USSR, and the settlement of peace in Victnam; on 
the Cuban side, the decline in the exportation of the revolution to 
Latin Amcrica and a more compromising attitude toward divergent 
systems in the area. Until now, however, there have been only minor 
changes in the positions of the chicf leaders of the two countries, and 
the conditions for negotiation established by both scem irreconcilable.°! 
In October 1969—with an cye on the increasing number of military 
and authoritarian regimes in Latin Amcrica—President Nixon pragmati- 
cally stated that, in the future, the United States would deal with these 
countries realistically as they are. This has justificd the United States’ 
close economic and military cooperation with Brazil and its cautious 
policy vis-a-vis Peru and, Chile. United States officials have not 
Palaaca DQ00INOIN . A PNHP7o_. YVAADDODTOOR S000 
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ApprovediForineredsW tenet te CROP 7s 2041 sIAGeo TOs 
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nteramerican system as a deterrent for normalizing relations between 
the two countries. (The ‘‘interamerican system’ was never clearly 
defined but looscly meant zepresentative democracy plus market 
conomy, a formula which is mow absent in most of Latin America and 
has been substituted within, the OAS by the new doctrine of 
‘ideological pluralism.””) The United States government, however, has 
not modified its stand vis-a-vis the other two preconditions established 
for the restoration of relations with Cuba: (1) cutting her military ties 
with the USSR, and. (2) stopping her subversion in Latin America. 
Throughout 1970-73 the President of the United States, the Secretary 
of State, and the Assistant Secretaries for Interamerican Affairs have 
reiterated (in reports to the.United States Congress, the OAS, the Latin 
American countries, and the news media) that Cuba has not changed its 
position on these two points.°? In 1971 the State Department 
acknowledged that ‘‘Cuba’s active assistance to subversive elements was 
apparently at reduced levels” but pointed to her-intransigent rejection 
of a. return to the OAS as proof that the situation was not ripe.for.a 
revision. 
This deadlock has been slightly altered by occasional events, most of 
which have aggravated. the existing tension: the frequent hijacking of 
United States planes to Cuba; the.capture in early 1970 of a Cuban 
fishing boat and its crew by a group of Cuban exiles (there were attacks 
on Cuban fishing boats in the fall of 1972 and in early 1973 also), the 
establishment late in 1970 of a Soviet servicing facility for submarines 
in the Cuban port-of Cienfuegos; the detention and expulsion from the 
United States in 1971 of a Cuban delegation that attempted. to 
participate in an international sugar conference held in New Orleans;, 
and at the end of that year the seizure by the Cuban Navy of two 
vessels under the Panamanian flag. The latter probably was the gravest 
incident of all: the. State Department qualified it.as ‘“‘an intolerable 
threat” to free trade and navigation in the Caribbean; Pentagon sources 
indicated that air and naval units-were being placed on alert and that 
they: would go in aid of any attacked ship under a foreign registry if the 
corresponding government requested it; and the Navy reported that 
warships stationed in Guantanamo (that is, in Cuban territory) would 
be sent to the Caribbean to engage in a potential ‘confrontation with 
Cuban war vessels.*° 	. 
Only ina few cases have there been positive exchanges between the 
two nations: in 1971, the entrance of a United States volleyball tea 
into Cuba and of a Cuban baseball team into Puerto Rico; in 1972, thd 
attendance. of an official United States scitntific delegation (from tha 
Commerce Department) at an international oceanographic conferenca 
held in Havana:®* and in 1973, the hijacking agreement. The latter had 
been considered on several occasions and ‘was precipitated when i 
November 1972 the hijacking of an airplane almost caused disaster i 
both the United States and Cuba. (The hijackers threatened to crash th¢ 
plane into the Oak Ridge Atomic Genter and the landing in Havan4 
presented serious problems because the airplane had been damaged b 
BI agents’ bullets.) Discussions began immediately through the Swis} 
Embassy in Havana and the agreement was simultaneously signed in tha 
50001-2

grants to each nation the right to deport the hijacker of an aircraft or 
vessel or to try him in its own territory and according to its own laws. 
In the latter case hijacking for “‘strict political reasons” may .be 
considered as a mitigating or extenuating circumstance providing that 
the hijacker (a) was in “real and imminent danger of death”; (b) did not 
have “a viable alternative for leaving the country”; (c) did not use 
financial extortion (any funds obtained through this means are to be 
returned without delay); and (d) didnot cause physical injury to the 
CPYRGHT 
members of the crew, passengers, and other persons. These conditions, - 
at Icast in theory, considerably reduce the probability of political 
hijacking. Another important clause in. the agreement stipulates 
penalties for those who conspire, prepare, or take part in an expedition 
to carry out acts of violence against the territory, aircraft, or vessels of 
the other party.® This was obviously intended to protect Cuba against 
attacks from exiles and may explain why the agrecment has reccived no 
publicity in the United States, 
In the few cases in which the United States and Cuba have had 
positive exchanges (including the hijacking agreement) top officials 
from one or the other country rapidly dismissed any hope that such 
exchange could imply a modification of their respective basic policies. 
The United States expects Cuba to break the ice, as President Nixon 
indicated in his speech of April 1971, on the United States-China 
understanding: ‘If the Cuban policy toward us should change, then we 
would consider changing ours. That is, we would take a step 
forward .... Havana hasn’t taken any steps, so relations with Cuba 
remain frozen.” Premier Castro answered, saying that there would not 
be an overture from Cuba. and that his country would neither be 
penmaees nor stop its support of all revolutionary movements in Latin 
Amcrica.® 	i 
In 1971-1972 Castro spoke several times on his own preconditions 
for a rapprochement with the United States. When visiting Chile, he 
remarked that to reach an understanding it would not be necessary for 
a revolutionary or socialist government to be in office in the United 
States but just a realistic government (‘‘a President of wide vision and 
broad understanding”) aware of the United States, Latin American, and 
world situations and aspirations, and, hence, assuming a policy of peace. 
According to Castro, Nixon, although a realistic man, does not 
represent those trends and has been aggressive and reactionary in the 
past: ‘‘Nixon will never visit Havana!” Cuba will wait until the proper 
man is installed in the White House. Two conditions would also have to 
be met by the ideal government for a normalization of relations with 
Cuba: (1) an end to the war in Vietnam, and (2) an end to the United 
States role of gendarme in Latin America, that is, her abstaining from 
any intervention as in the past.°’ 
In a press conference in Sofia, Bulgaria, held in May 1972, Castro 
dismissed as false a Mexican newspaper report saying that he was 
planning to meet Nixon in Warsaw: ‘We are not at all interested in such 
a meeting [and] would refuse [it].” He then stated that Cuba would 
never yicld to the two United States conditions: “We will not give in 
one iota in this respect.’’ Since Cuba had been able to overcome the 
mast ca tests pascd b the United States, Castro ar} at “it

B50001-2 
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SA [now].” Then he assumed the ‘same attitude that. the American | 
resident had taken a year before: “Nixon, is the one who’s got to do | 
omething.” He would have to meet, “with no strings attached,”’ the 
o conditions set by Castro in Chile: (1) an end to the Vietnam war, | 
[ 
| 
nd (2) an end to United States intervention in Latin America; plus two. | 
}dditional ones: (3) lifting the economic embargo of Cuba, and. (4) 
betting the naval base out of Guantanamo. Castro said that Cuba would 
ait two, four, ten years until such conditions were met and. further 
rated that ‘Kissinger and all those advisers and ‘big brains’ will never 
68 
ome to Havana or hold any kind of meeting with us. 
In his speech of July 26, 1972, Castro reiterated that Cuba’s doors 
ould be closed to ‘“‘Nixon’s cheap politicking and dirty deals.’’ At the 
kame time, he expressed satisfaction at seeing “the advances and new 
formulations in the policies of the United. States” made at the 
Democratic Convention and that ‘one of the presidential: candidates 
[McGovern] was in favor of lifting the blockade: against Cuba.” 
However, he attacked violently another point of the Democratic 
platform which stated that ‘Cuba could not become a-Soviet military]. 
base. “In our territory we do as we damn pleasc! And no [United]. 
States] party platform has any right to establish: prerequisites of any | 
kind with regard to Cuba.” Finally he reiterated the four conditions, | 
enumerated in Bulgaria, necessary to begin negotiating the restoration ! 
of relations with the United States. ° 	. | 
What are the actual possibilities of the United States meeting th | 
Cuban conditions or vice versa? It is clear that the socialist system © 
Cuba is no longer at issue and that the United States has concentrated 
all its emphasis on external matters. As this’ article proves, Cuba’ 
military and economic links with the USSR have increased in the last 
decade, especially in the 1970s;.hence, the United States demand that 
Cuba close the door to her Soviet friends has induced: the opposite 
result. Without having some guarantees from the. United States first 
Cuba could not cut her links with the USSR because it would have lef 
her vulnerable to the former. The Soviet-Cuban military relationship 
prescnted a serious threat to the internal security of the United State 
in October 1962, but during the Missile Crisis the leaders of the twe 
superpowers reached an agreement; this apparently. has been honored 
by the USSR, which. gave explanations to the United States at the timg 
of the installation of its submarine base in Cienfuegos. The secon¢ 
United States condition was directed mainly at protecting the secur] 
of the American allies in Latin America. In many cases, however, thos 
allies. exaggerated the real threat in order to increase United States aid 
in others, they managed (with or without United States aid) to captur¢ 
the expeditions or defeat the guerrillas coming from Cuba. Since 196% 
the island. has turned inward, dramatically reducing her efforts t 
export the revolution. ‘With its increasingly compromising attitud 
toward divergent systems in Latin America—shown in this article—Cubp 
has proven that she can be a peaceful neighbor. (The Soviet interest i 
normalizing the Cuban situation in the Western Hemisphere has been ap. 
important factor in this’ change; thus, the Sovietization of 
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The tae United Grates cOndTHOAS for neaotauon while widening 
gap in the other.) And yet, the Cuban leaders could not afford to 
acknowledge publicly that they were another paper tiger and thus have 
continued their mostly rhetorical support of the revolutionary move- 
ments in the area. If the United States would drop its two conditions 
(this action should preferably take place within the OAS, perhaps with 
the United States supporting a motion similar to that presented by Peru 
in 1972) and if a rapprochement were eventually to take place, the two 
United States security objectives would probably be achieved anyway: 
peaceful relations with the United States and Latin America could: 
result in the increased independence of Cuba vis-a-vis the USSR and in an 
even more conventional foreign policy of the island vis-a-vis her neighbors. 
The first condition set by the Cubans has been met already with the 
end of the war in Vietnam. (In his speeches of December 1972 and May 
1973 Castro dropped this condition.) Concerning the second condition, 
the last United States intervention in Latin America occurred more 
than eight years ago in the Dominican Republic; in view of the United 
States experience there and in Vietnam, it is doubtful that such an 
action would be repeated. Certainly the United States could put the 
Cubans against the wall, promising to abstain from intervention 
provided that the Cubans do the samc, and agreeing to keep the 
agreement secret. The third condition sct by the Cubans (raised to first 
condition on May 1st by Castro who added that it should precede any 
discussion and be unconditional) could be acecpted without any 
significant disadvantages for the United States and probably with some 
gain. The economic embzrgo caused serious problems to Cuba at the 
time of its inception, but most of them have been overcome by now. 
Still some difficulties remain: the increased cost of freight (Cuba's main 
markets moved from 90 to 6,000 miles away); the higher costs paid on 
United States spare parts bought by Cuba through intermediaries 
(according to the Cubans the overprice ranges from 20 to 30 percent); 
the difficulties with shipping (Cuba’s merchant marine carries only 7-8 
percent of the island’s trade); the relatively poor assortment and low 
quality of goods in Eastern Europe (as compared with the United 
States); and the higher price that the Cubans pay for their imports from 
the Soviet bloc. 7 But Cuba is capable of selling all that she produces 
{actually the problem is that slre does not produce enough) and of 
buying practically everything that she needs either from socialist or 
market-economy countries. The ‘embargo, instead, has served the 
Cubans as an excuse for their poor economic performance and as a 
propaganda tool for despising the United States as a superpower 
strangling a small nation. Dropping an economically inoperable 
embargo would probably result in an improved political image of the 
United States abroad. The fourth condition is for the United States to 
get out of Guantanamo. This naval base, according to the opinion of 
military experts, does not have strategic significance today and is not 
really necessary to the United States. Its doubtful psychological value 
(‘in spite of Castro we are still there’) is offset by the risks of a grave 
incident that it constantly poses. (Castro seems to have placed low 
priority on this condition; he rested importance on it in December 
1972 and, although he reconfirmed it as one of his conditions on May 
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€ put a low priority on it. Hence this condition may be a CPYRGHT 
subject of negotiation.) 
An American yielding on most of the Cuban conditions could be 
interpreted as a calamitous defeat. Conversely, the United States | 
position could be presented as that of a great nation which has taken 
the initiative in removing a point of friction in the world, thus 
enhancing its own image and eliminating that of an encircled but 
challenging neighbor. The example of China proves that taking a noble 
initiative pays well in terms of both domestic and world opinion. There 
would also be more tangible benefits for the United States as a result of 
this normalization, such as the elimination of incidents between the 
two countries that could precipitate a grave confrontation. 	| 
At this point Castro and Nixon are cach waiting for the other to | 
make an overture; the question is who can afford to wait longer. Both | 
men are.realistic and opportunistic statesmen who have accepted many 
compromises in the past to obtain and keep themselves in power. Dr. 
Kissinger is reported to have said, prior to the United States presidential 
elections in 1972, that, if Nixon were reelected, the normalization of 
relations with Cuba would then be “on the agenda.” 7! On the other 
side, although Castro has stated several times that neither Nixon nor | 
Kissinger will visit Havana, he has left the door open to negotiation by | 
establishing his conditions and repeating them on various occasions. Let | 
us now review the internal-and external forces that the two men face | 
and that could influence their decisions. 	| 
By the end of the fall of 1972 Nixon seemed assured of another four | 
years in the White House-and his power was strengthened by his 
electoral victory. United States congressmen, such as Senators 
Fulbright, Hughes, and Kennedy, had unsuccessfully urged a revision of | 
the United States policy toward Cuba. In April 1972 a “Congressional | 
Conference on United States-Cuban Relations” took place in the | 
Senate, sponsored by 30 senators (all Democrats except three), with a | 
team of 15 specialists debating the main issues. The Conference was 
intended for information rather than action; thus, it did not make any 
specific-recommendations although it was positive toward a normaliza- . 
tion of relations with Cuba (measures suggested were: ending the 
‘embargo and travel restrictions; reestablishing commercial flights; and 
promoting the exchange of publications, scholars, newsmen, athletes, 
and artists). 7? After the hijacking agreement was signed, a group of 
Republican congressmen called for a dialogue with Cuba that could lead 
to an eventual normalization of relations between the two nations “in | 
the interest of the United States.” Until the Watergate scandal | 
seriously weakened Nixon’s power, the United States Congress was 
incapable of influencing him in favor of a rapprochement with Cuba 
(this was obviously proved by the inability of the Congress to impose 
upon the President a compromise on the more vital problem of 
Vietnam). In mid-1973, with the outcome of the Watergate affair still | 
uncertain, any further discussion on this matter appears as sheer 
speculation, nevertheless one thing is certain: even if Nixon is cleared of 
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more compromising role with the Congress than before. Externally, 
Nixon’s position has been strengthened on the one hand but weakened 
on the other, In the last decade the increasing Sovietization of Cuba has 
not recreated any internal security problems for the United States and 
conversely has helped in moderating the island’s foreign policy. Sad as 
it is, the United States is better off dealing with a Soviet-controlled 
Castro than with him loose,.creating all sorts of trouble. It would not 
be surprising if Nixon took advantage of his trip to Moscow to reach 
some understanding with the Soviet leaders on the future of Cuba as he 
probably did on Vietnam. Finally, the hijacking agreement has helped 
in dramatically reducing two frequent sources of tensions: diversion of 
United States aircraft to Cuba and attacks of exiles against the Cuban 
territory and vessels. On the other hand, while Castro has become more 
peaceful and dependent on the USSR, his Latin American brothers have 
behaved in a more independent manner vis-a-vis the United States and 
“have presented a challenge to the latter on numerous fronts. In 
mid-1972 only two Latin American countries had relations with Cuba, 
| 	but one year later the number had risen to nine and two other countries 
were expected to follow the same path soon. Still, at least one-third of 
| 	the OAS members were in favor of the status quo. Thus, by mid-1973 
the likelihood was that Nixon would not have to face an immediate 
CPYRGHT 
challenge on Cuba at the OAS similar to that of China at the UN but, at 
the speed that the situation was changing, it was difficult to conceive 
that the problem could be postponed until 1976. The pressures from 
the majority of the Latin American countries which are in favor of a rap- 
prochement, the crisis in the OAS, the weakened presidential power, 
and a desire to emulate in his second term the foreign policy achieve- 
ments of the first may move Nixon into taking the initiative soon. 
Castro appears also to be in a weak internal position in view of the 
erosion of his charisma and the challenge to his power by internal 
forces led by Rodriguez and supported by the USSR. These forces give 
priority to the island’s domestic problems and are in favor of the 
institutionalization of the Revolution and the normalization of its 
status in the Western Hemisphere. Economically, Cuba is doing poorly 
but has been able to survive the embargo, and the new economic 
agreements with the USSR will help. The reestablishment of trade with 
the United States would help to ease the burdens of the country but 
would not be enough stimulus to induce Castro to an agreement. 
Normalization of relations with the United States would be a way to 
achieve more independence for Cuba but perhaps at a high cost for the 
Premicr’s power. Both for the United States and the USSR, Rodriguez 
would be a more reasonable, predictable, and responsible statesman to 
deal with than Castro, and.he knows this well. Jt is doubtful that the res- 
toration of United States-Cuban relations would result in enlarged power 
for Castro if the United States and the USSR have already reached an 
understanding. There is another way to look at the problem; and this is 
that, in the past, Castro has exploited the real or imagined encirclement 
by the United States to his own advantage: as a scapegoat for the 
frequent mistakes of his administration and as a phantom to keep his 
forces united and to impose his personalistic-autocratic will. Castro’s 
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for his own sake. His bitter criticism of Nixon and his provocative 
statements are indications of. his concern about losing power, while his 
setting of conditions for negotiation is probably a result of Soviet 
pressure on him. Thus.it is safe to predict that he will take the initiative 
in the negotiations only if he perceives that resisting Soviet pressure for 
normalization would crode his power even more. In view of the current 
state of Soviet-Cuban and United States-Soviet relations it is unrealistic 
for the United States to ask Castro (even if full guarantees are given to 
him to preserve his power and the socialist system on the island) to cut 
his ties with the Soviets and become totally independent. Between the 
two extremes (full Sovietization and total independence) lies a broad 
field for negotiation and the United States initiative could be critical in 
the outcome. 
The United States policy of isolation of Guba and ‘“‘wait-and-see,”’ 
practiced in the last decade, has allowed an increasing Sovictization and 
totalitarianism of the Cuban Revolution with the consequent curtail- 
ment of political and individual freedoms and vanishing of the 
autochthonous characteristics of the Cuban process. The initial 
American manifested concern over the negative domestic features of 
the Cuban regime (be it rhetorical or real) has been totally displaced by 
the United States’ own interests in external] affairs, The normalization 
of American-Cuban relations could help to gain some independence for 
the island and more freedom and less economic hardships for its people. 
These results are by no means assured beforehand but would depend 
largely on the attitude and concerns of the United States. If it decides 
to take the initiative and does not neglect the interests of the Cuban 
people at the bargaining table, it may induce the slow transformation of 
the current autocratic and Soviet-dependent Cuban regime into a more 
democratic, humane, and independent socialist system. In an era of 
realpolitik, this may be considered a rather naive and romantic 
suggestion with which to close this article, but not-for those who dream 
of a-better world for tomorrow. 4 
Notes 
1. See K. S. Karol, Guerrillas in Power: The Course of the Cuban Revolution (New York: 
Hill & Wang, 1970); Edward Gonzalez, “Relationship with the Sovict Union,” in Carmclo 
Mesa-Lago, ed., Revolutionary Change in Cuba (Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 
1971), pp. 81-104; Charles Bettclheim, “La révolution cubaine sur Ja voie ‘soviétique,”” Le 
Monde, May 12, 1971; and Leon Gouré and Julian Weinkle, ‘“Cuba’s New Dependency,” 
Problems of Communism, 21 (March-April 1972), pp. 68-79. 	: 
2. Radio Moscow, transmissions of December 9, 1970, and February 22, 1971. The 
extension of the trade agreement was not reported by the Cuban press. 
3. Granma Weekly Review, May 2 and 16, 1971, p. 12, and June 20 and 27, p. 1. 
4. “Cuban-Sovict Commission for Economic, Scientific and Technical Collaboration Holds 
First Session,” Gramma Weekly Review, September 12, 1971, p. 7. 
5. “Novikov and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez Sign Protocol of Collaboration. between Cuba 
and the USSR” (and in smaller print: “Prime Minister Gastro Attends Signing”), Grauma 
Weekly Review, September 19, 197], p. 3. 
6. Radio Moscow, transmission of September 25, 1971. 
7.. “Palabras cn el Reparto Alamar,” Institute. Cubano de RadiodifusiOn, transmission of 
October 27, 1971. Sec also the daily edition of Granma, October 25-30, 1971. 
8 “Joint Sovict-Cuban Communique,” Granma Weekly Review, November 7, 1971, p. 1. 
9. Press Interview, Granma Weckly Keview, December 19, 1971, pp. 12-13. 
10. At the concluding session af the Soviet-Cuban Commission's first meeting, Rodriguez 
i 
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the 
of "Rosygin s visit, oviet side said that Cuba was “constructing the foundations of 
socialism.”” The importance of the Dorticés-Brezhnev statements is that they were made at 
Moscow, using the correct Russian terminology and, then, were reproduced in the Cuban press. 
See Granma Weekly Review, January 2, 1972, p. 12. 
11. Granma Weekly Review, January 9, 1972, p. 10. 
12. See Marcel Nicdergang, “La récent voyage de M. Fidel Castro a confirmé sun 
aliignement sur Moscou,” Le Monde Diplo matique, August 1972; “Brazil, Sugar Challenge to 
Cuba,” Latin America, 2 (January 1972), Pp. 9-10; and “‘Inestabilidad del mercado azucarcro,”” 
Progreso, August 1972, pp. 35-76. 
13. “Cordial Nixon-Mao Interview; Chou-Nixon Friendly Meeting; Paper Tiger Gives 
Syrupy Specch in Peking,” Granma Weekly Review, February 27, 1972, pp. 1, 7, 12. See also 
tbid., March 5, 1972, pp. 1, 12. 
14. “Sale Nixon... en viajt a la URSS,” Granma, May 17, 1972, p. 5; “Liegé Nixon a 
Mosct,” ibid., May 23, p. 6; “Actividades de Nixon en Mosci,” ibid., May 24, p. 5; “Licgé 
Nixon a Varsovia,” ibid., June 1, p. 6; “Termin6 Nixon su visita a Polonia,” ibid., June 2, p. 7. 
The weekly editions of Granma did not publish news on the visit. 
15. “Firman Cuba y la URSS Protocolo de la segunda sesién de-la Comision Interguber- 
namental de Colaboraci6n Reondmica y Cientffico-Técnica,” Granma, April 17, 1972, p. 6. Sec 
also A. Voronov, “Soviet-Cuban Cooperation Enters New Stage,” Jurernational Affairs 
* (Moscow), September 1972, p. 81, 
16. Ral Castro, “Speech at the Naval Parade on Revolutionary Navy Day,” Granma 
Weekly Review, August 13, 1972, p. 5. 	. 
17. Radio Rebelde, transmission of April 18, 1972. See also Granma Weekly Review, April 
23, 1972, p. 2. 
18. F. Castro, “Speech at the May Day Parade and Workers’ Rally,” Granma Weekly 
Review, May 7, 1972, p. 5. Information gn the trip comes from ibid., May-July editions and the 
Cuban radio. See also “Fidel por 10 paises,” Cuba Internacional, 4 (September 1972), pp. +71. 
19. Until Cuba’s entrance Comecon was composed of the seven Eastern European countries 
visited by Castro, plus Mongolia. Observers were Cuba, North Korea, North Vietnam, and 
Yugoslavia. In 1962, Albania was excluded. China neither entered Comecon nor sent observers. 
20. C. R. Rodriguez, “Speech at the'26th Session of the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance,” Granma Weekly Review, July 23, 1972, p. 10. 
21. See for instance Gouré and Weinkle’s opinion, op. cit., p. 77, published three months 
before Cuba entered Comecon. 
22. Theodore Shabad, “Cuba Becomes Full Member of Soviet Economic Bloc," New York 
Tunes, July 12, 1972, p. 2. 
23. Rodriguez has argucd that statistical similarity could not hold in economic and political 
terms. See “Dialogo con Carlos Rafacl Rodriguez,” Cuba Internacional, 3 (November-December 
1971), pp. 86-91. 
24. See my chapter, “Economic Policies and Growth,” in Mesa-Lago, op. cit., pp. 301 ff. 
25. Sovict sources are: Vneshaiaia torgovlia SSSR: statisticheskii sbornik 1918-1966 and 
Vaeshiiaia torgovlia SSSR 2a 1968 god (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnie Otnosheniia, 1967 and 
1969), pp. 69 and 15; Foreign Trade (Moscow, No. 6, 1970, p. 55; and No. 5, 1971, p. 48. 
Cuban sources are Junta Central de Planificacién, BE Boletin Kstadfstico 1970 (La Habana: 
JUCEPLAN, 1971), pp. 188-191. See also Eric N. Baklanoff, “International Economic 
Relations,” in Mesa-Lago, op. cit., Pp. 258-276. 
26. In 1971 the value of Soviet imports increased by 17 percent to a record 800 million 
pesos, while Cuban exports to the USSR probably declined by 40 percent to 280 million pesos 
due to a decline in sugar production from 8.5 million tons in 1970 to 5.9 million tons in 1971. 
Probably the level of Soviet imports in 1972 remained equal while that of Cuban exports to the 
USSR declined due to an even worse sugar crop. The 1971-72 combined deficit was probably 
above onc billion pesos, 
27. By Gouré and Weinkle, op). cit., p. 75, without giving a clear source, 
28. F. Castro, “Speech at the Main Event in Commemoration of the Victory of Playa 
Garan.” Grauma Weekly Review, May 2, 1971, p. 6. 
29, Martin Schram, “Cuba Today: The Party Seeks Economic Revival,” Newsday, 
“eiember 13.1971; and Gouré-Weinkle, op. cit., p. 78. 
Sit See Gonrales, ap. cit pp. 82-86. 
EOF Castra. “Speech on the 19th Anniversary of the Attack on the Moncada Garrison,” 
vesecs Verily Kemew, August 6, 1972, pp. 3-6. 
"2 “Pacsutve Committee of Council of Ministries Established,” Granma Weekly Review, 
roe PMT p 2, 
Po Castea. “speech at the Solemn Session in Honor of the 50th Anniversary of the 
tana VWerkly Review, December 31, 1972, p. 9. Castro also said (p. 16) that he felt 
ear Mascow and that a man could have two homelands. 
34. F. Castro, “Report to the People on the Economic Agreements Signed with the Soviet 
Union,” Granma Weekly Review, January 14, 1973, pp. 2-3. 
35. “3rd Session of the Cuban-Soviet 
eekly Review, March 4, 1973, p. 3. 
the Revolutio 
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V1. Lenin,” Granma Weekly Review, May 3, 1970, pp. 2-5. 
38, F. Castro, “Speech at the Close of the Main Rally Marking the Beginning of ‘the 
Ten-million-ton Sugar Harvest," Granma Weekly Review, July 20, 1969, p. 5, 
39. F. Castro, ‘Discurso en conmemoracion del Centenario del Natalicio de Lenin," 
Granma, April 23, 1970, pp. 2-4. 	‘ 
40. Granma Weekly Review, December 26, 1971, and January 2, 1972. In March 1973 	| 	7 
Cuba freed one of the two “yernaining Cuban-born prisoners as 4 friendly gesture toward 
Panama. 	= 
41. Granma Weekly Review, March 25, 1973, pp. 8-11. 
42. CORFO, Chile Economit News, February 27, 1971, p. 3. 	| 
43. Granma Weekly Review,-April 1, 1973, p. 8. 	; 	| 
44. Comercio Exterior (Mexico), March 1972; and Latin America, March 16, 1973, p- 83. 
45. “Caribbean: Cuba Back in the Fold?” Latin America, October 20, 1972, p. 229; and 
Granma Weekly Review, December 24, 1972, p. 13. 
46. Granma Weekly Review, May 20 and June 3, 1973, p..1. 
47. Granma Weekly Review, January 7, 1973, p. 8. ; 	i 
48. Cuban exiles reacted negatively to Figueres’ suggestion with a few remarkable 
exceptions, e.g., Castro’s former Minister of Finance Rufo Lépez Fresquet. 
49. Marvine Howe, ‘Venezuela Opens Cuban Contacts,” The New York. Times, April 22, 
1973, p. 17. 
50. Time, April 16, 1973, p. 38. 
$1. F. Castro, “Speech at the International Workers’ Day Parade,”’ Granma Weekly Review, 
May 13, 1973, p. 3. 
52. Cuban relations have not only improved with Latin America but with other nansocialist 
countries as well, Trade with Japan, France, Italy, Canada, Great. Britain, Spain, and Sweden 
increased notably in 1970-73, reaching the half-billion mark. Cuba imported equipment (for 
transportation, agriculture, industry, and construction), received technical assistance and credits 
from these countries in exchange for sugar, nickel, tobacco, and rum, See Svea Ornstedt SIDA 	| 
(Stockholm), July 15, 1971; “Cuba,” Barclays Economic Intelligence. Department (London), 
December 17, 1971; “Cuba: From Dogma to Pragmatism,” BOLSA Review (Landon), Apni 
1972; and “Cuba's Links with Nonsocialist World Expanding,” Business Latinamerica, April 20, 
1972. At the end of 1971 Castro stated that Cuba was in the process of overcoming the 
economic embargo and that the island had a growing foreign market and could sell all that she. 	| 
was capable of producing. Gramma Weekly Review, November 21, 1971, p. 8, and November 
28,1971, p.4. . 
53. “Press Conference with Newsmen frum Different Countries,” Granma Weekly Review, 	i 
December 19, 1971, pp. 8-9. For a detailed account of Castro's 1971 trip. to Chile and stops in 
Lima and Quito, sce George W. Grayson, “The Significance of Castro's Trip to South America,” 
World Affairs, Vol. 135 (Winter 1972), pp. 220-239. 	| 
54. F, Castro, “Speech at the Close of the Main Rally,” op. cit., p. 3; “Discurso en con- 
memoracion del Centenario,” pp. 2-4; and “Speech at the Main Event,” op. cit., p. 6 
55. Benjamin Welles, “More Latin Lands Seem Willing to End Ban on Cuba.” New York 
Times, August 14, 1971, p. 3. 
56. Ibid.; and “Peru: End of Story,” Latin America, June 2, 1972, pp. 169-170. 
57. “Cuba: From Dognia to Pragmatism,” p. 201; and “Cuba and the Recent Vote in the 
OAS,” Granma Weekly Review, June 18, 1972, p. 12. ; 
5%, Galo Plaza's statement was made on April 26, 1973, at the Conference, “The OAS 
Today and Tomorrow,” University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. 
59. F. Castro, “Speech at the International Workers’ Day Parade,” op. cit., Pp. 2-3. 
60. For example, the 1968 conversations between Antonia Nites Jiménez, president of the 
Cuban Academy of Scicnees, and American intellectuals who tried to facilitate the interchange 
of scholars and publications; the 1968-69 agreements of the Hispanic Foundation, Library of 
Congress, and of the Latin American Studies Association in order to promote intellectual 
interchange; the seminars held in 1968-69 by the Center for Inter-American Relations (CIAR) 
of New York with the purpose of recommending to the United States government a new policy 
with respect to Cuba; and the 1969 Ford Foundation grants made available for field research in 
Cuba. See also the articles by John N. Plank, “We Should Start Talking with Castro,” New York 	. 
Times Magazine, March 30, 1969, pp. 29 ff.; Irving Louis Horawitz, “United States-Cuba 
Relations: Beyond the Quarantine,” Trans-action, April 1969, pp. 43-47; Richard Fagen, 
“United States-Cuban Relations,” Wale HH. Ferguson, ed., Contemporary liter-American 
Relations: A Reader in Theory and Issues (New York: Prentice Hall, 1972), pp. 192-203 (this is | 
Fagen’s report to the CIAR mectings &f 1968-69); and Jorge I. Dominguez, “Taming the Cuban 
Shrew.” Foreign Policy, no. 10 (Spring 1973), pp. 94-1 16. 
61. For background on United Stares-Cuban relations sce Cole Blasier, “The Elimination of 
US Influence,” in Mesa-Lago, op. cit., pp. 43-80: and Edward Gonzalez, “The United States and 
Castro: Breaking the Deadlock,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 50 (July 1972), pp- 722-737. 
62. For instance, Robert A. Hurtwitch in February 1970 in the TV program “The 
Advocates," in July 1970 before the House Forcign Affairs Committee, in September 197] 
befere the Senate Forcign Relations Committee, and in February 1973 before the Congress; a 
State Department report to the QAS in March 1970; Seerctary Rogers to the Congress in March 
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1971; Charles Appleton Mcyer to the press in July 1971; and President Nixon to the press in 
April 1971 and January 1972. 
63. Granma Weekly Review, December 26, 1971, and January 2, 1972. 
64. Tad Szulc, “U.S. Government Scientists Attended Parley in Cuba, New York Times, 
July 11, 1972. 
65. Granina Weekly Review, February 25, 1973, p. 3. 
66. Castro, “Speech in the Main Event,” op. cit., p. 6. 
67, Grauma Weekly Review, December 19, 1971, pp. 10-13; and George Natanson, "Nixon 
Doesn't Represent World Realities—Castro,” The Times of the Americas, May 13,1972, p. 2. 
68, Grama Weekly Review, June 4, 1972, p. 6. Two wecks later the Cuban press 
mentioned conditions 3 and 4 ignoring the first two. In October Castro mentioned conditions 1 
and 2 ignoring the last two. In December he ignored condition 1 (the end of the war in Vietnam 
was in sight) and seemed willing to yicld on condition +. In May 1973 he definitely dropped 
condition 1, reiterated 2 and 3 (although changing their order, therefore giving priority to a 
domestic matter over an interamerican issuc), and said that condition 4 was still on but had a 
lower priority. 
69. F. Castro, “Speech on the 19th Anniversary,” op cit., p. 6. 
70. Some of these problems were explaincd bricfly by Castro, “Speech at the Main Event,” 
ap. cit., p. 6 
71. “Cuba: Lure of the Market,” Latin America, Octoher 20, 1972, p. 229. 
72. “Congressional Conference on United States-Cuban Relations,”” Washington, D.C., New 
Senate Office Building, April 19-20, 1972. 
73. Latin America, February 23, 1973, p. 64. 
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